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ABSTRACT 
  A centuries-old controversy asks whether judicial elections are 
inconsistent with impartial justice. The debate is especially important 
because more than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is 
handled by state courts, and approximately nine in ten of all state 
court judges face the voters in some type of election. Using a stunning 
new data set of virtually all state supreme court decisions from 1995 to 
1998, this paper provides empirical evidence that elected state supreme 
court judges routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and 
campaign money. I find that judges who must be reelected by 
Republican voters, especially in partisan elections, tend to decide 
cases in accord with standard Republican policy: they are more likely 
to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor 
disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for 
businesses in products liability cases and tort cases generally, and 
against criminals in criminal appeals. Judicial behavior is 
correspondingly liberal for judges facing reelection by Democrats. 
Moreover, I find evidence that judges change their rulings when the 
political preferences of the voters change. 
  In addition, my analysis finds a strong relationship between 
campaign contributions and judges’ rulings. Contributions from pro-
business groups, pro-labor groups, doctor groups, insurance 
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companies, and lawyer groups increase the probability that judges will 
vote for the litigants favored by those interest groups. The results 
suggest that recent trends in judicial elections—elections becoming 
more contested, competitive, and expensive—may have upset the 
delicate balance between judicial independence and accountability. I 
discuss various policy solutions for reforming states’ systems. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .............................................................................................625 
I.  The Historical Tension between Judicial Accountability and 
Independence................................................................................630 
II.  The Threat from State Courts’ Increased Politicization...............639 
III.  Predicted Effects of Increasing Politicization on Judges’ 
Decisions .......................................................................................645 
A. The Increasing Need to Appeal to Constituents.....................646 
B. The Increasing Need to Raise Campaign Funds .....................649 
IV.  Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Retention Politics on 
Judges’ Voting ..............................................................................652 
A. The Model’s Technical Structure..............................................653 
B. Details of the Model ...................................................................654 
1. Dependent Variable ..............................................................654 
2. Retention-Politics Variable ..................................................655 
3. Control Variables...................................................................656 
4. Estimation Method ................................................................659 
C. Primary Empirical Results .........................................................660 
D. Influences on Judges Not Facing Retention............................662 
E. Effect of Changes in Retention Agents’ Preferences .............665 
V.  Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Campaign Contributions 
on Judges’ Voting .........................................................................666 
A. Empirical Model .........................................................................667 
B. Primary Empirical Results .........................................................669 
C. Results for Judges Not Facing Reelection ...............................672 
VI.  Proposals for Reform ......................................................................674 
A. Permanent Tenure and Maintaining Accountability..............675 
B. Reforming Judicial Elections.....................................................680 
C. Reforming Campaign Finance...................................................681 
Conclusion................................................................................................683 
Appendix: Full Set of Primary Results .................................................685 
SHEPHERD IN FINAL.DOC 1/12/2009  12:05:26 PM 
2009] MONEY, POLITICS, AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE 625 
INTRODUCTION 
A centuries-old debate asks whether judicial elections are 
inconsistent with impartial justice. The debate is especially important 
because more than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business 
is handled by state courts,1 and approximately nine in ten of all state 
court judges face the voters in some type of election.2 Using a 
stunning new data set of virtually all state supreme court decisions 
from 1995 to 1998, this Article provides empirical evidence that 
elected state supreme court judges routinely adjust their rulings to 
attract votes and campaign money. The results suggest that recent 
trends in judicial elections—elections becoming more contested, 
competitive, and expensive—may have upset the delicate balance 
between judicial independence and accountability. 
For many academics, elite lawyers, and federal judges, it is an 
assumed truth that judges should be protected completely from public 
influence.3 Public pressure on judges to rule a certain way is a 
menace. Safety from the menace is found only in providing strict 
judicial independence. From this perspective, judicial heroes are 
southern federal judges with life tenure resisting racist threats and 
public hatred to integrate public schools. Tragedies are the stories of 
justices like Rose Bird, whom California voters threw off the state 
supreme court in 1986 because she refused to uphold death 
sentences.4 
 
 1. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice, Wis. Supreme Court, The Ballot and the Bench, 
Address at the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice (Mar. 
15, 2000), in 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2001); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign 
Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & 
POL. 57, 77 (1985). 
 2. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077 app. 2 
at 1105 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of Advice and 
Consent, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 3, 4–5 (Nat’l Legal Ctr. for 
the Pub. Interest ed., 1990); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting 
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
273, 277–82 (2002); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995); Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The 
Search for Quality and Representativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 420–22 (1981); Ben F. 
Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections: A Time for Re-Examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 9, 15–17 (1988–89); Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of 
Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1559–63 (1988). 
 4. See Robert Lindsey, Deukmejian and Cranston Win as 3 Judges Are Ousted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, at A30. For an account of the opposition to Bird, see JOSEPH R. GRODIN, 
IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 167–79 (1989). 
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Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court recently expressed this 
perspective. The Court reluctantly upheld on First Amendment 
grounds New York’s system for electing judges.5 But in their 
concurrence, Justices Kennedy and Breyer noted: 
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct 
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for 
competition among interest groups and political parties, the 
persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the 
perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial 
excellence.6 
They concluded: 
The rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a 
functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional 
attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem 
difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections.7 
Likewise, Justices Stevens and Souter agreed with “the broader 
proposition that the very practice of electing judges is unwise.”8 They 
regretfully concluded, “The Constitution does not prohibit 
legislatures from enacting stupid laws.”9 
But this independence model for the judiciary is not the only 
model that reasonable minds accept. Indeed, the public has 
overwhelmingly chosen a different model for the judiciary: the 
accountability model. Under this model, judges are accountable to 
their constituents because they may not be reelected if they make 
rulings with which voters disagree. The federal judges who are the 
main examples of the independence model take care of only a sliver 
of the country’s litigation. Instead, more than 90 percent of cases in 
the United States are litigated in state courts,10 and 89 percent of all 
state court judges face the voters in some type of election.11 Moreover, 
 
 5. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008). 
 6. Id. at 803 (Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 801 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring). 
 9. Id. (quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall). 
 10. Abrahamson, supra note 1, at 976; Schotland, supra note 1, at 77. 
 11. Schotland, supra note 2, app. 2 at 1105. 
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surveys reveal that over 75 percent of the U.S. public prefers elections 
over appointments for selecting judges.12 
In Part I, I discuss how judicial elections are almost as old as the 
country itself. The accountability model came to dominate state 
courts during the Jacksonian era as a careful, reasoned response to 
the perceived lack of accountability of appointed judges. Moreover, 
proponents argued, electing judges increased judicial independence 
rather than reduced it.13 Elections ensured that judges would be 
responsive to the citizens rather than to the officials who appointed 
and retained the judges. 
Controversy about judicial elections is likewise as old as the 
elections. For more than a century, leading academics and lawyers 
have called them “mobocracy,” “disgraceful,” “shocking,” and 
accused them of “destroy[ing] the traditional respect for the bench.”14 
Likewise, many state judges dislike elections. According to former 
Justice Otto Kaus of the California Supreme Court, the pressure of 
facing the voters for reelection is like “hav[ing] a crocodile in your 
bathtub . . . . You keep wondering whether you’re letting yourself be 
influenced, and you do not know. You do not know yourself that 
well.”15 
Despite two centuries of controversy about judicial elections, 
however, no empirical study has yet addressed one of the central 
issues in the controversy: the degree to which the political preferences 
of both voters and campaign contributors influence judges’ decisions. 
Proponents of the independence model believe that elections and 
retention politics affect judges’ rulings a lot.16 In contrast, supporters 
of the accountability model believe that any influence is modest.17 
Both groups’ beliefs, however, are based only on anecdote. 
The absence of information on this fundamental issue is 
especially important because of recent developments in judicial 
elections. As I discuss in Parts II and III, three recent trends have 
 
 12. See, e.g., GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE: 
FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 7 (2001), available at http://faircourts.org/files/JASNational 
SurveyResults.pdf. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 31–32. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 26, 71–72. 
 15. Dan Morain, Kaus to Retire from State Supreme Court; Deplores Strident Attacks on 
Justices in Anti-Bird Effort, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985, at A1 (quoting Justice Otto M. Kaus, Cal. 
Supreme Court). 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 32–47. 
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transformed many judicial campaigns from sleepy boredom to bracing 
competition. First, many more judicial elections are being contested, 
with a challenger running against the incumbent.18 Second, 
incumbents are losing at a much higher rate than before.19 For 
example, in partisan elections in 2000, more than 45 percent of 
incumbents lost, a much higher loss rate than for elections in both 
U.S. and state legislatures.20 Third, recent decades have seen dramatic 
increases in the amounts of money spent in judicial campaigns.21 For 
example, spending in partisan state supreme court elections averaged 
more than $1.5 million in 2004.22 No study has yet addressed whether, 
under this newly heated competition for votes and money, judges will 
shape their rulings to get them. 
This paper fills that gap. I exploit a stunning new data set that 
includes detailed information on virtually every state supreme court 
case in all fifty states between 1995 and 1998. It includes more than 
28,000 cases, involving more than 470 judges. The data include 
variables that reflect case histories, case participants, legal issues, case 
outcomes, and individual judges’ behavior. Using multivariate 
regression techniques, I measure the impact on judges’ rulings of 
politics and money: the degree to which individual judges’ rulings are 
related to the political preferences both of the people who will decide 
whether the judge will be retained and of those who contribute 
money to the judge’s campaign. 
I explore two distinct routes through which the politics of 
elections and campaign contributions from interest groups can 
influence judges’ voting. First, the need to attract both votes and 
interest groups’ campaign contributions could persuade judges to vote 
in certain ways. Second, voters and interest groups may be more 
likely to both contribute to the campaigns and vote for the judges 
whose votes are consistent with their own preferences. Under both of 
these possibilities, elections and interest group contributions 
influence state supreme court rulings. In the first case, the influence is 
direct, influencing judges to change their votes. In the second the 
influence is indirect, increasing the probability that a judge whose 
 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 90–94. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 99–100. 
 22. See infra text accompanying note 103. 
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votes favor an interest group or group of voters will be reelected. But 
the first question is whether there is any influence at all. 
In Part IV, I present several empirical results that suggest that 
retention politics are associated with judges’ rulings. That is, I find 
that under some retention methods, judges’ voting is associated with 
the political preferences of those who will decide whether the judges 
keep their jobs. For example, the results indicate that when judges 
face Republican retention agents in partisan reelections, they are 
more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in 
labor disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, 
for businesses in products liability cases, for original defendants in 
tort cases, and against criminals in criminal appeals. The magnitudes 
of the marginal effects are substantial but reasonable. For example, a 
judge facing a partisan reelection when voters are Republican rather 
than Democrat is approximately 36 percentage points more likely to 
vote in favor of businesses over individuals. 
The results also suggest that, unlike judges facing retention 
decisions, judges who do not need to appeal to voters shape their 
rulings to voters’ preferences less. For example, voters’ politics has 
little effect on the rulings of judges with permanent tenure or who 
plan to retire before the next election. 
Furthermore, when the preferences of those who will reappoint a 
judge change, so too do the judge’s rulings. The results show that 
when a Republican governor replaces a Democratic governor, judges 
are more likely to vote in favor of the business in a business-versus-
person case, in favor of the employer in a labor dispute, and in favor 
of defendants in general in tort cases. This is strong evidence for the 
hypothesis that retention politics directly influence judges; their 
rulings change after a change in retention agents’ preferences, as 
proxied by the governor’s party affiliation. 
Next, in Part V, I discuss my empirical analysis of the 
relationship between interest groups’ campaign contributions and 
judges’ voting. The results support the hypothesis that money can buy 
justice. That is, I find that contributions from interest groups are 
associated with increases in the probability that judges will vote for 
the litigants favored by those interest groups. Contributions from pro-
business groups are associated with increases in the probability that a 
judge will vote for the business litigant in a business-versus-individual 
case, in a products liability case, and in tort cases generally. 
Contributions from pro-labor groups are associated with reductions in 
the probability that judges vote for the employers in labor disputes. 
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Contributions from doctor and hospital groups are associated with 
increases in the probability that judges vote for the original 
defendants (who are often doctors and hospitals) in tort cases. 
Contributions from insurance companies are associated with 
increases in the probability that judges will vote for those that that the 
companies typically insure: businesses in business-versus-person 
cases, businesses in products liability cases, and original defendants in 
tort cases. In contrast, contributions from lawyers’ groups, whose 
members are mainly plaintiffs’ lawyers, are associated with reductions 
in the probability that judges will vote for those same litigants that are 
typically defendants. 
Taken together, the results suggest that the accountability model 
may be under stress. If elections ever maintained the delicate balance 
between independence and accountability that the original supporters 
believed they would, my results suggest that this balance may be at 
risk. With increasingly competitive elections and the inflow of 
campaign money, some judges may frequently adjust their rulings to 
attract votes and dollars. 
In Part VI, I discuss various possible policy solutions for 
reforming states’ judicial election systems. I first explore the 
possibility of granting permanent tenure to state judges, and I discuss 
the judicial selection systems in several other countries that have 
permanent tenure. Then I discuss other reforms such as eliminating 
partisan elections, moving to a system of public financing of judicial 
elections, voluntary spending limits on campaign spending, and 
stricter recusal rules for judges. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
The modern tension between judicial accountability and judicial 
independence is almost as old as the United States itself. The 
appointment of state judges originally resembled that of the federal 
judiciary. In all of the original thirteen states, judges were appointed 
either by the executive or legislature.23 But, in 1812, Georgia became 
the first state to amend its Constitution to provide for popular 
elections for all trial judges.24 In 1832, Mississippi became the first 
 
 23. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 14–15 (1955). 
 24. LARRY C. BERKSON AS UPDATED BY RACHEL CAUFIELD, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, 
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Berkson.pdf. 
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state to elect all of its judges, including those on courts of appeals.25 
Some were aghast. One former member of Mississippi’s supreme 
court complained at the time, “Our constitution is the subject of 
ridicule in all the States where it is known. It is referred to as a full 
definition of mobocracy.”26 
Yet election of judges was an idea whose time had come. “Every 
state that entered the union before 1845 did so with an appointed 
judiciary.”27 In contrast, each state that entered between 1846 and 
1959, more than a century later, had judicial elections.28 By 1865, 24 of 
the 34 states elected their judges.29 
The rise of an elected judiciary occurred as part of the 
Jacksonian era’s championing of popular democracy. A core value of 
Jacksonianism was a distrust of unrepresentative, unaccountable 
government officers, and an affection for the mass of ordinary 
people.30 Jackson described his core value: “the first principle of our 
system—that the majority is to govern.”31 Civic virtue would prevent 
the majority from mistreating minorities. 
Jackson and his followers worked diligently to steer government 
away from promoting narrow interests and special privileges. Jackson 
sought to have U.S. senators and representatives elected directly, and 
to eliminate the electoral college.32 Similarly, an attempt to eliminate 
another unelected elite opened wide the doors to the professions. For 
example, requirements for becoming a lawyer were almost completely 
eliminated. In almost every state, one could now qualify to practice 
law without attending law school and by submitting to only a brief, 
easy-to-pass oral exam.33 The new openness permitted a poor boy 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. EDWIN ARTHUR MILES, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY IN MISSISSIPPI 42 (1960) (quoting 
NATCHEZ (Miss.), Nov. 9, 1832); see also Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly 
Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 190, 190 (1993) (commenting on Mississippi’s submission of the appellate court to the 
electorate, “[a]lthough Indiana and Georgia had been electing trial judges for years, the election 
of appellate judges seemed beyond the pale”). 
 27. Nelson, supra note 26, at 190. 
 28. See BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 222. 
 31. HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 
97 (1990) (quoting Andrew Jackson). 
 32. Nelson, supra note 26, at 222–23. 
 33. George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation 
and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2115, 2123 (1998). 
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from a backwoods cabin to become a leading Illinois lawyer and 
president. 
The movement to elect judges fit the Jacksonian philosophy 
perfectly. State after state established an elective judiciary only after 
long, cautious debate in constitutional conventions.34 Supporters came 
to believe that appointing judges did not ensure judicial 
independence.35 Influences on judges were inevitable.36 If judges were 
appointed, then this influence would come from the officials who 
appointed and retained them;37 that is, judges would shape their 
rulings to please the governors and legislators. It was preferable 
instead that this influence come directly from the people, through 
popular elections. In the Massachusetts convention, one delegate said 
of judges: “They are men, and they are influenced by the 
communities, the societies and the classes in which they live, and the 
question now is, not whether they shall be influenced at all, . . . but 
from what quarter that influence shall come.”38 In the Kentucky 
convention, another delegate answered that the judge “is to look 
somewhere for his bread, and that is to come from the people. He is 
to look somewhere for approbation, and that is to come from the 
people.”39 
Moreover, the judiciary could function as a check and balance on 
the other governmental branches only if it truly were independent of 
them. A judge who was appointed by the executive or legislature, and 
so beholden to them, could not be truly independent of them. The 
only means to a truly independent judiciary was election by the 
people. As noted in the Illinois debates, because “one object of the 
judiciary was to protect the people from the other branches of the 
 
 34. Nelson, supra note 26, at 222–24. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 217. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE 
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 773 (Boston, White & Potter 1853) [hereinafter 
MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853] (statement of Edward Keyes). 
 39. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 1849, at 273 (Frankfort, A.G. 
Hodges & Co. 1849) [hereinafter KENTUCKY CONVENTION OF 1849] (statement of Francis 
Bristow). 
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government,”40 it was necessary that the judiciary was “above the 
control of the legislative or executive departments.”41 
In addition, supporters believed that voters, not politicians, 
would select the best judges.42 The appointment process too often led 
to the selection of party hacks, with the judiciary often serving as 
pleasant pasture for failed but loyal politicians who had lost 
elections.43 
Finally, supporters argued that elections would ensure a judiciary 
that had the optimal combination of independence and contact with 
the people’s will. They believed that elections would not pervasively 
bias judges’ decisions; the judges’ consciences would assure that. 
Instead, the elections would offer a modest disciplining force that 
would induce judges not to stray dramatically from the people’s 
preferences. A delegate to the Massachusetts convention explained 
the harms of excessive independence: “I like to have independent and 
upright men in all public stations, but I do not like the idea of having 
any public officers entirely independent of the people. I think they 
should be so dependent at least, as to have an eye to the power they 
serve.”44 Similarly, an Indiana delegate explained how elections might 
help to create the proper relationship between judge and people, the 
right balance of independence and accountability: “I do not say that 
he should be so much under their influence as to be awed into 
decisions, but merely that he should understand their will.”45 
The convention delegates strove to create a system that gave 
judges strong incentives to heed the public good.46 As a leading 
commentator notes, “the judiciary became elective not so much to 
 
 40. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 466 (Arthur Charles Cole ed., 1919) 
[hereinafter ILLINOIS CONVENTION OF 1847] (statement of Archibald Williams). 
 41. Id.  
 42. See Kermit L. Hall, The ‘Route to Hell’ Retraced: The Impact of Popular Election on the 
Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832–1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
SOUTH 229, 230 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1983); Nelson, supra note 26, 
at 200. 
 43. Id. 
 44. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1853, supra note 38, at 785 (statement of Rodney 
French). 
 45. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1662 (Indianapolis, A.H. Brown 
1850) [hereinafter INDIANA CONVENTION OF 1850] (statement of Henry Thornton). 
 46. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 224. 
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permit the people to choose honest judges as to keep judges honest 
once they reached the bench.”47 
Nevertheless, the supporters of an elected judiciary recognized 
that elected judges might occasionally feel excessive pressure from 
excited voter majorities.48 The supporters felt, however, that this 
danger was less than the dangers of an appointive system. In an 
appointive system, the officials who appointed and retained the 
judges would exert even greater influence and pressure on them.49 
Even a judge who was appointed for life would be forever beholden 
to the official who had appointed him. Moreover, appointed judges, 
especially those with life tenure, were examples of what Jacksonians 
feared most: unelected government officials with unchecked power.50 
Because a judge with life tenure is unaccountable to the people, the 
judge is, in effect, in the same position as a dictator. 
Careful structuring of the election process could reduce any 
dangers of excessive popular influence.51 For example, in most states, 
judges would have long terms.52 The terms would be staggered; this 
would assure that all judges could not be thrown out together in a fit 
of popular excitement.53 Judges would not be permitted to run for 
other elected offices during their terms.54 Finally, elections would be 
by district, rather than at large.55 This would again reduce the 
possibility that an excited state-wide majority could remove large 
numbers of judges. 
This accountability model—judicial independence tempered by 
modest popular influence through a carefully structured election 
system—continued to flourish even after its initial success in the mid-
1800s.56 The number of states with elected judges continued to grow.57 
Contemporary examples suggest the accountability model has 
had some success in achieving its historical proponents’ goals. First, it 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 218; Schotland, supra note 2, at 1094. 
 49. See, e.g., KENTUCKY CONVENTION OF 1849, supra note 39, at 270 (statement of James 
Guthrie); id. at 225 (statement of Squire Turner). 
 50. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 222. 
 51. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1094. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Nelson, supra note 26, at 218. 
 54. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1094. 
 55. Nelson, supra note 26, at 218. 
 56. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1093–94. 
 57. Id. at 1093. 
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promotes selection of judges whose values reflect those of the public. 
Alan Page’s 1992 election to the Minnesota Supreme Court is one 
example.58 Page is an African-American former professional football 
star who had become a successful lawyer.59 He was unable for years to 
convince politicians to appoint him to any judgeship in Minnesota, 
trial or appellate.60 His lack of success may have been due to 
stereotypes about the intelligence of football players, especially 
African-American ones, that he saw arising during his later 
campaign.61 Unable to gain appointment, he filed to be a candidate in 
an election for the supreme court. He was elected in a landslide, with 
61 percent of the vote.62 Although opinions may differ about whether 
other appointed candidates would have been better judges than Page, 
the election results indicate that his appointment represented the 
people’s will. 
Second, the accountability model has succeeded in removing 
judges who stray substantially from voters’ preferences. A recent 
example is Jack Hampton, a Texas district court judge, who imposed 
an unusually light sentence on a defendant who had been convicted of 
killing two gay men.63 He explained: 
These homosexuals, by running around on weekends picking up 
teen-age boys, they’re asking for trouble . . . . I don’t care much for 
queers cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys. 
  . . . I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level. And I’d be 
hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute.64 
Although the State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured 
Hampton for his remarks, it did not remove him from office.65 When 
he ran for a seat on the Texas court of appeals, however, he was 
defeated.66 His opponent received approximately 20 percent of her 
 
 58. Id. at 1091. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (quoting Alan C. Page, Justice, Address at the Summit on Improving Judicial 
Selection (Dec. 8–9, 2000)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1047 (2007). 
 64. Lisa Belkin, Report Clears Judge of Bias in Remarks About Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 1989, at A25 (quoting Jack Hampton, Judge, Dallas County Criminal Dist. Court). 
 65. Karlan, supra note 63, at 1047–48. 
 66. Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at B20. 
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campaign contributions from gay and lesbian groups.67 Hampton’s 
remarks and decision in the case were major issues in the campaign.68 
Judge Hampton’s ruling may have been sincere and based on his 
conscience. Proponents of the accountability model, however, believe 
that the judge’s conscience should not necessarily triumph over the 
consciences of the voters.69 As Professor Karlan notes, “once we move 
away from decisions in particular cases and toward the 
pronouncement of general legal rules, it is even less clear that 
individuals ought to be selected or retained without regard for their 
viewpoints. . . . To some extent, then, judges should pay attention to 
popular views.”70 According to this approach, judges do not prostitute 
themselves by responding to a modest extent to voters’ views any 
more than any elected representatives do. 
Despite both the successes and the public support for judicial 
elections, angry criticisms of the elected judiciary continued on after 
its inception. Periodically, ardent supporters of the independence 
model, often elite academics and bar leaders, have lashed out at the 
pervasive policy of electing judges. One such period was as the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Ex-President William Howard 
Taft blustered in 1913 that judicial elections were “disgraceful” and 
“so shocking . . . that we ought to condemn [them].”71 Likewise, 
Professor Roscoe Pound stated: “Putting courts into politics and 
compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has 
almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.”72 
Yet the dominance of the accountability model endures and is 
increasing. It has prevailed in all except federal courts and a sliver of 
state courts. When President Taft and Professor Pound raged a 
century ago, eight in ten state court judges were subject to election.73 
As of 2004, approximately nine in ten were.74 
Nevertheless, some states have modified aspects of their judicial 
elections. For example, by 1927, twelve states had switched from 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 63, at 1048. 
 70. Id. 
 71. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE 
AND ITS PERILS 194–95 (1913). 
 72. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906). 
 73. Guilty, Your Honour?, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 28, 29. 
 74. Id. 
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partisan elections, which revealed judges’ party affiliations, to 
nonpartisan elections.75 Other states moved to another election 
variation, the so-called “merit selection plan,” also commonly known 
as the “Missouri Plan” after Missouri became the first state to adopt it 
in 1940.76 Under merit selection plans, a bipartisan judicial nominating 
commission reviews applications for judgeships and then compiles a 
list of qualified applicants.77 The governor then appoints one of the 
candidates from the commission’s list.78 Once appointed, the judge 
regularly faces unopposed nonpartisan retention elections; the ballot 
asks only whether the judge should be retained, and does not mention 
party affiliation.79 
This long historical evolution has led to variations of the 
accountability model. The modern selection methods are partisan 
elections, nonpartisan elections, gubernatorial appointment, 
legislative elections, legislative appointments, and merit plans. 
Although in many states the methods of selection and retention are 
the same, in other states they are different. The following are the 
combinations that states have chosen: 
1. Judges selected through gubernatorial appointment and merit 
plans are retained through gubernatorial reappointment, 
legislative elections, unopposed retention elections, or 
reappointment by a judicial nominating commission. 
2. Judges selected through legislative appointments are retained 
through legislative reappointments. 
3. Judges that are originally elected in partisan elections are 
retained through partisan elections or unopposed retention 
elections. 
4. Judges originally elected in nonpartisan elections are retained 
only through nonpartisan elections. 
 
 75. BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 2. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON 
L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2005) (citing BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 2). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. 
L. REV. 803, 804 (2004). 
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Table 1 shows each state’s methods of selection and retention for 
the study period, 1995 to 1998.80 
Table 1.  Methods of Selection and Retention by State81 
State 
Selection 
Method 
for Full 
Term 
Method of 
Retention State 
Selection 
Method 
for Full 
Term 
Method of 
Retention 
Alabama P P Montana N N 
Alaska M R Nebraska M R 
Arizona M R Nevada N N 
Arkansas P P New Hampshire82 G — 
California G R New Jersey G G 
Colorado M R New Mexico P P 
Connecticut83 LA LA New York M G 
Delaware M G North. Carolina P P 
Florida M R North Dakota N N 
Georgia N N Ohio84 N N 
Hawaii M J Oklahoma M R 
Idaho N N Oregon N N 
Illinois P R Pennsylvania P R 
Indiana M R Rhode Island85 M — 
Iowa M R South Carolina LE LE 
Kansas M R South Dakota M R 
 
 80. Although there are other differences between the selection and retention methods of 
each state, they are generally grouped into these primary categories. See BERKSON & 
CAUFIELD, supra note 24, at 2. 
 81. DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 
1998, at 21–25 tbl.4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 178932, 2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Methods of Judicial 
Selection, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm? 
state= (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). G = gubernatorial appointment or reappointment, P = partisan 
election or reelection, N = nonpartisan election or reelection, LA = legislative appointment or 
reappointment, LE = legislative election or reelection, M = merit plan, R = retention election, 
and J = reappointment by a judicial nominating commission. 
 82. In New Hampshire, judges serve until age seventy. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 81,  at 
28 n.18. 
 83. In Connecticut, the Governor nominates candidates from a merit-commission list, and 
the legislature appoints. Id. at 25 tbl.4. 
 84. In Ohio, political parties nominate candidates that are then chosen in nonpartisan 
elections. Id. at 28 n.24. 
 85. In Rhode Island, judges have life tenure. Id. at 28 n.27. 
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Kentucky N N Tennessee M N 
Louisiana P P Texas P P 
Maine G G Utah M R 
Maryland M R Vermont M LE 
Massachusetts86 M — Virginia LA LA 
Michigan87 N N Washington N N 
Minnesota N N West Virginia P P 
Mississippi N N Wisconsin N N 
Missouri M R Wyoming M R 
The states’ judicial selection and retention methods continue to 
provoke hot controversy. The states face the same concerns they 
faced two hundred years ago: which methods achieve the best balance 
of judicial independence and accountability. With almost 90 percent 
of all state judges facing voters in some way, however, and almost 90 
percent of all state appellate judges being subject to a retention 
decision by either voters or other politicians,88 a critical issue is the 
degree to which election pressures influence judges’ decisions. 
II.  THE THREAT FROM STATE COURTS’ INCREASED 
POLITICIZATION 
As those who implemented it first indicated, the accountability 
model functions properly only if judicial elections’ impact on judges’ 
decisions is modest and in the background. The model’s success 
depends on elections creating an appropriate balance between 
independence and accountability, with judges mindful of the public 
will but not slaves to it. If, instead, judicial elections profoundly and 
pervasively influence how judges decide cases, then judicial 
impartiality is lost and the accountability model fails. 
Three trends in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
have created threats to this delicate balance.89 The trends have 
increased politicization of state supreme courts and elections, and 
they have created pressure for justices to behave and rule politically. 
 
 86. In Massachusetts, judges serve until age seventy. Id. at 28 n.8. 
 87. In Michigan, political parties nominate candidates that are then chosen in nonpartisan 
elections. Id. at 28 n.12. 
 88. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 12 (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org 
/D_Research/CallToActionCommentary.pdf. 
 89. See, e.g., Nathan Richard Wilderman, Casenote, Bought Elections: Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 765, 769–72 (2003). 
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First, the fraction of contested elections, in which a new 
candidate challenges the incumbent, has increased. The fraction has 
always been higher in partisan systems than in nonpartisan systems.90 
Both partisan and nonpartisan systems, however, have recently 
experienced increases in the number of contested elections.91 In 1984, 
only 33 percent of nonpartisan elections were contested.92 By 2000, 
this number had increased to 75 percent.93 Likewise, 75 percent of 
partisan elections were contested in 1988.94 By 2000, this number had 
grown to 95 percent.95 
Second, as elections have become more contested, incumbents in 
partisan elections have found it harder to win. Mirroring the 
differences in the percentage of contested races for nonpartisan and 
partisan elections, incumbents in nonpartisan elections are much 
more likely to be reelected than those in partisan elections.96 Whereas 
approximately 7 percent of incumbents were defeated in nonpartisan 
elections between 1980–2000, approximately 23 percent of 
incumbents were defeated in partisan elections.97 Moreover, the loss 
rate for incumbents has increased dramatically in partisan elections 
over this period. In 1980, 26.3 percent of incumbents were defeated in 
1980, but in 2000, the loss rate for incumbents was a stunning 45.5 
percent,98 much higher than the rate at which incumbents lose in the 
U.S. House or Senate or in state legislatures.99 
The third trend is the dramatic increase in spending on judicial 
campaigns from the 1990s to the early twenty-first century. The 
average contested state supreme court race in 1990, including both 
 
 90. Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State 
Supreme Court Elections, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 21, 27 tbl.6 (2004); Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda 
Gann Hall, Predicting Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections: Context and the Politics of 
Institutional Design, 56 POL. RES. Q. 337, 343 tbl.2 (2003). 
 91. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 27 tbl.6. 
 92. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 90, at 343 tbl.2. 
 93. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 27 tbl.6. 
 94. Bonneau & Hall, supra note 90, at 343 tbl.2. 
 95. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 27 tbl.6. 
 96. Melinda Gann Hall, Judging the Election Returns: Competition as Accountability in 
State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, 
AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 165, 178 tbl.9.5 (Matthew Streb ed., 2007). 
 97. Id. at 177 tbl.9.4. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths 
of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 319 (2001); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. 
Bonneau, Does Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 50 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 20, 21 (2006). 
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partisan and nonpartisan contests, involved $364,348 in campaign 
spending.100 A similar race in 2004 cost $892,755.101 
Spending in partisan elections has increased substantially more 
than spending in nonpartisan elections. Between 1990 and 2004, 
average campaign spending in nonpartisan elections increased by 
approximately 100 percent, from approximately $300,000 to 
$600,000.102 In contrast, average spending in partisan elections during 
this period increased from approximately $425,000 to $1.5 million, an 
increase of over 250 percent.103 
The expense of state supreme court races varies greatly among 
the states. Table 2 presents the average spending on state supreme 
court races between 1994 and 2000, by state. The states with the most 
expensive campaigns are states that elect judges in partisan elections. 
Moreover, the most expensive nonpartisan states (Ohio and 
Michigan) are states that nominate candidates in partisan primaries 
but use nonpartisan general elections.104 
Table 2.  Average Spending per Supreme Court Campaign,  
by State, 1990–2004105 
State  
 
Average Spending per 
Campaign 
Pennsylvania 2,250,773 
Alabama 1,450,673 
Illinois 1,371,590 
Ohio 1,193,205 
Texas Supreme Court 1,155,125 
Louisiana 1,080,113 
Michigan 927,019 
West Virginia 887,218 
Mississippi 599,251 
Nevada 593,816 
 
 100. Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court 
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES 
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 59, 63. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 63 fig.4.1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. For a thorough explanation of differences in campaign spending among the states, see 
id. at 63–68. 
 105. The information in this table can be found in Bonneau’s article. Id. at 67 tbl.4.2. 
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Wisconsin 559,505 
Kentucky 422,063 
North Carolina 366,742 
Montana 359,974 
Georgia 289,865 
New Mexico 273,398 
Arkansas 264,320 
Washington 205,601 
Oregon 183,107 
Idaho 124,579 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals106 116,841 
Minnesota 108,185 
The cost of supreme court campaigns, especially in partisan 
elections, has risen so dramatically that it is often difficult, if not 
impossible, for candidates to win elections without substantial 
funding.107 In 1997–1998, the top campaign fundraiser prevailed in 
approximately 75 percent of contested state supreme court races, and 
in 2001–2002, the top fundraiser won in 80 percent of the elections.108 
Thus, with few exceptions, more money is a prelude to victory. 
Four forces have contributed to the growth in competitiveness 
and expense of judicial elections. The forces are not all independent; 
many cause or reinforce each other. First, in the mid-1970s, people 
discovered that vigorously contesting a judicial election could be 
effective. Until then, judicial elections were “low-key affairs, 
conducted with civility and dignity,”109 which were “as exciting as a 
game of checkers. Played by mail.”110 Then in Los Angeles in 1978, a 
group of deputy district attorneys offered to support any candidate 
who would run against an unopposed incumbent trial judge.111 This 
 
 106. Because of issues like tort reform, and the accompanying interest group involvement, 
Texas Supreme Court elections are significantly more expensive than elections to the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 67. 
 107. Bonneau, supra note 90, at 32 & tbl.11; Wilderman, supra note 89, at 769–80. 
 108. It is possible that more money does not cause victory; instead, pending victory may 
create the inflow of money. Donors may be generous with the candidate that they expect to win, 
even if the candidate would win without the money. 
 109. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995). 
 110. William C. Bayne, Lynchard’s Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice into Justice Race, COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 29, 2000, at DS1. 
 111. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1080. 
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led to “an unprecedented number of contests and defeated judges.”112 
Others recognized the possibilities of this technical innovation, and 
copied it.113 
Second, campaigns may be more competitive and expensive 
because the stakes may be higher. State supreme courts may have 
increased in power and influence during recent decades. For example, 
case filings have increased dramatically, with the number of cases 
filed in some state appellate courts doubling every ten years between 
the 1960s and 1980s.114 The second half of the twentieth century has 
also brought an increase in controversial cases in state courts, such as 
environmental protection, the rights of criminal defendants, abortion, 
political apportionment, and industry-wide liability for toxic torts.115 
In addition, the new judicial federalism following the federal 
government’s increasing tendency to devolve power to the states has 
enhanced the power of the states’ supreme courts.116 
Third, interest groups, many from outside the state, have become 
powerfully active in judicial elections,117 thrusting large amounts of 
money into them. Between 1968 and 1988, the number of registered 
special interest groups in the United States doubled from 10,300 to 
20,600.118 Similarly, during the 1940s, there were only five hundred 
registered lobbyists in Washington; as of 2000 there were over 
25,000.119 The increase in interest group involvement was originally 
isolated to legislative and executive elections.120 It soon spread to 
judicial elections, however, as interest groups found this a cost-
effective means to influence state policy; it was cheaper and easier to 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS, 
1999–2000: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 76 (Brian J. 
Ostrom, Neal B. Kauder, Robert C. LaFoundtain eds., 2001). 
 115. ABA COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 14 (2003). 
 116. See id. at 15 (“While federal and state courts both witnessed an upsurge in the 
controversial, policy-laden cases they were called upon to decide in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, this trend has become especially noticeable in state court systems. . . . [S]tate 
courts have become a new forum of choice for litigation of constitutional rights and 
responsibilities, which has placed them in the political spotlight with increasing frequency.”). 
 117. See id. at 8–9, 18. 
 118. See G. Calvin MacKenzie, The Revolution Nobody Wanted, TIMES LITERARY 
SUPPLEMENT (London), Oct. 13, 2000, at 13. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial 
Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2, 4–5 (2003). 
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affect the outcome of a judicial election than the outcome of a 
legislative or executive branch election.121 
The significant interest group involvement in state judicial 
elections began in Texas in the 1980s when business interests and 
trial-lawyers’ groups fought over tort reform.122 In most states, the 
majority of the contributions to state judicial campaigns comes from 
groups hoping to shape tort law.123 The major opponents are trial 
lawyers and unions, on one side, who tend to promote the candidacies 
of judges who favor tort plaintiffs. Against them are business interests 
and professional groups, such as physicians, who tend to promote the 
candidacies of defendant-friendly judges. 
Criminal justice is also an important issue for interests groups. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, three high-profile incumbent losses in 
state supreme courts involved criminal justice issues. In 1986, three 
California Supreme Court Justices, including Rose Bird, were 
defeated in an expensive retention-election battle.124 Commentators 
attribute their defeats to the substantial funds raised by interest 
groups that opposed the justices’ anti-death penalty rulings.125 
Similarly, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost a 
retention election in 1996, largely because of interest group 
opposition to her anti-death penalty rulings.126 In that same year, 
Judge David Lanphier was the target of a well-funded interest group 
campaign opposing his reelection to the Nebraska Supreme Court 
because he had vacated several murder convictions during his 
previous term.127 
Fourth, changes in the law permitting judges to participate more 
openly and aggressively in judicial campaigns has contributed to the 
increasing competitiveness of judicial elections. Until 1990, a canon of 
judicial conduct in the ABA Model Code had prohibited judges from 
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues.128 That 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1483, 1487 (2005). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1411, 1420 (2001); Lindsey, supra note 4. 
 125. See Champagne, supra note 124, at 1420. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Judicial Retention Elections: The Defeat of Justices 
Lanphier and White, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 41, 52–54 (2000). 
 128. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1989). 
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year, the ABA eliminated the canon because of First Amendment 
concerns.129 Soon, twenty-five of the thirty-four states that had 
adopted it eliminated it.130 In 2002, the Supreme Court struck down 
enforcement of the canon in the remaining nine states.131 Other 
appellate courts have struck down limits on judges’ fundraising, 
partisan conduct, and making pledges and commitments.132 
I now examine theoretical predictions about the impact that 
more competitiveness and money will have on judges’ independence 
and accountability. 
III.  PREDICTED EFFECTS OF INCREASING POLITICIZATION ON 
JUDGES’ DECISIONS 
The increasing politicization of both state supreme courts and 
elections to them may affect judges’ levels of independence and 
accountability. If the influence of election pressures on judges’ 
judicial decisions is nonexistent or modest, then this would support 
arguments of proponents of the accountability model. They argue 
that judicial elections will operate at most as a moderate constraint on 
judges, but without warping their decisions. In contrast, if elections 
influence judges’ decisions strongly, then this would support the 
independence model. It would suggest that, unless judges are freed 
completely from election pressures, their decisions will be 
fundamentally biased. 
I now discuss the potential impacts on judges’ decisions of the 
increasing competitiveness of state supreme court elections and the 
increasing importance of campaign contributions. 
 
 129. ABA ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 355–58 (Arthur Garwin ed., 
2004). 
 130. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1095 n.77. 
 131. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002); Schotland, supra note 2, 
at 1095 n.77. 
 132. E.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 754, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(striking down limits on judges’ partisan conduct and personal solicitation of campaign 
contributions); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (striking down a 
solicitation clause, which failed strict scrutiny); see also Schotland, supra note 2, at 1095–97 
(discussing White). 
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A. The Increasing Need to Appeal to Constituents 
As of 2006, 87 percent of state appellate judges must regularly 
face the voters to keep their jobs.133 These judges may have an 
incentive to rule strategically if doing so helps them get reelected. The 
hypothesis that reelection concerns influence judges’ voting is an 
extension of the electoral-incentive theory,134 which is the central 
principle in theories about legislative politics and empirical analyses 
of it. This theory, which was a new way of thinking about the 
behavior and incentives of legislators when it was introduced in the 
1970s, asserts that a candidate’s primary goal is to be reelected.135 
Because candidates cannot achieve any other goals if they are not 
elected, election is their overriding goal. Extending this theory to 
state supreme courts, judges without life tenure have the incentive to 
decide cases in ways that benefit the litigants favored by the people 
responsible for retaining judges (the retention agents). This is true 
whether the retention agent is a politician who decides whether to 
reappoint the judge or the voters in a retention election. For example, 
if a judge expects to face reelection by conservative, pro-business 
voters, she may have an incentive to favor business litigants. 
Although all nontenured judges have the incentive to rule 
strategically if they believe it will help them gain reelection,136 the 
increasing competitiveness of elections has increased the pressures on 
 
 133. Eighty-seven percent of state appellate court judges must be retained through either 
partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, or retention elections. SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, 
CHANTAL G. BROMAGE & WILLIAM E. RAFTERY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2006: SUPPLEMENT TO EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS, 2006, at 96–97 fig.G (2007), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/ 
2006_files/IntroductiontoSCCS06.pdf. In contrast, I earlier explained that 89 percent of all state 
judges (appellate and trial) face voters at some point, either in the initial election or when 
seeking retention. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 134. See DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 11–78 (1974) 
(describing the electoral-incentive theory). 
 135. Id. at 13. 
 136. See Lawrence Baum, State Supreme Courts: Activism and Accountability, in THE STATE 
OF THE STATES 103, 126 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 1989) (“Increasingly, judges who wish to 
maintain their positions will take into account the possibility of opposition from interest groups 
and from the electorate as a whole.”); PHILIP DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 30 (1980) (“By exercising their control 
over the selection and tenure of public officials, voters can set effective limits upon the policy 
initiatives of the government.”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? 
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 41 (1993) (“[M]y 
analysis predicts that judges elected for a term . . . are more responsive to the current balance of 
political power, hence less ‘independent.’”). 
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judges. The increasing rates at which incumbents are defeated, 
especially in partisan elections, should heighten the pressure on 
judges to rule in a way that will help them be reelected. The political 
pressure on judges who face reelection may be even stronger than the 
pressure that legislators confront. Incumbent state supreme court 
justices in judicial elections are more likely to be defeated than 
incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate and 
state legislatures.137 From 1990 through 2000, reelection rates were 
approximately 94.1 percent in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
89.3 percent in the U.S. Senate, 85.1 percent in state houses, and 84.1 
percent in state supreme courts.138  
Like Chief Justice Rose Bird in California and Justice Penny 
White in Tennessee, many examples exist of judges that have been 
unseated over decisions that were unpopular with the retention 
agents.139 Campaigns have been mounted to unseat incumbent judges 
in Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois, California, 
Georgia, Idaho, Alabama, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas based 
on their unpopular judicial decisions in areas including crime control, 
victims’ rights, abortion, homosexual rights, water rights, school 
funding, and tort reform.140 
Many judges have admitted that reelection concerns may 
influence their judicial rulings. For example, former California 
Supreme Court Justice Otto M. Kaus commented: “[T]o this day, I 
don’t know to what extent I was subliminally motivated by the thing 
you could not forget—that it might do you some good politically to 
vote one way or the other.”141 Justice Kaus, who also likened election 
pressure to having a crocodile in the bathtub,142 then changed animals. 
“When you’re eating dinner with a gorilla, it’s hard to make small 
talk, even when he’s using the right knife and fork.”143 
Similarly, when participating in a series of interviews with the 
members of Louisiana’s high court, a liberal justice acknowledged 
that: 
 
 137. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 138. Hall & Bonneau, supra note 99, at 21. 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
 140. See Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 49–50 (2003). 
 141. Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
1986, at 3 (quoting Justice Otto M. Kaus,  Cal. Supreme Court). 
 142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 143. Hager, supra note 141 (quoting Justice Otto M. Kaus, Cal. Supreme Court). 
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his perception of his constituents was that they clearly preferred the 
death penalty as a punishment for murder and that they would 
retaliate against him at election time if the justice did not reflect 
constituent preferences in this set of judicial decisions . . . [and] he 
does not dissent in death penalty cases against an opinion of the 
court to affirm a defendant’s conviction and sentence, expressly 
because of a perceived voter sanction, in spite of his deeply felt 
personal preferences to the contrary.144 
Despite these anecdotes, no prior empirical paper has shown that 
the retention agents’ political preferences influence judicial voting. 
Some recent empirical studies have found other relationships 
between elections and judicial behavior. Some studies have shown 
that litigation patterns vary under different judicial selection systems. 
For example, litigation rates are lower in states where judges are 
elected, suggesting that elected judges’ political voting reduces 
uncertainty about court decisions so that more cases settle.145 
Similarly, plaintiffs file more antidiscrimination claims in states that 
elect judges than in states that appoint judges; elected judges may 
have stronger pro-employee preferences, inducing more employees to 
file claims.146 
Other studies have shown that the behavior of elected judges 
changes as reelection approaches. The judges deviate from earlier 
voting patterns,147 impose longer criminal sentences,148 and side with 
the majority in death penalty cases.149 
Still other studies find that judges’ behavior varies under 
different selection methods, especially under systems with partisan 
elections. For example, judges who face partisan elections are less 
 
 144. Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes 
and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1120 (1987). 
 145. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of 
Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210 (1999). 
 146. Timothy Besley & A. Abigail Payne, Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: 
Does Judicial Discretion Matter?, 1, 18 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Research Paper 
No. PEPP04, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158326. 
 147. See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 
54 J. POL. 427, 442 (1992). 
 148. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind 
when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004). 
 149. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the 
American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 24 (1995); Hall, supra note 147, at 442. 
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likely to dissent on politically controversial issues,150 less likely to rule 
for challengers to a regulatory status quo,151 and more likely to 
redistribute wealth in tort cases from out-of-state businesses to in-
state plaintiffs.152 Not all studies find such results, however; one of the 
most recent papers finds almost no evidence of elected judges 
responding to political pressure.153 
No other paper, however, has addressed the bottom-line issue of 
whether judges bend their rulings to appeal to those who will be 
deciding whether they keep their jobs. 
B. The Increasing Need to Raise Campaign Funds 
Because the cost of winning a judicial election has increased 
dramatically,154 judges feel pressure to rule in ways that will help them 
to obtain campaign funds. Although mine is the first analysis to 
examine the relationship between interest group contributions and 
judges’ voting, the public certainly believes that judges are influenced 
by interest groups. A nationwide survey has revealed that 76 percent 
of voters and 26 percent of judges believe that campaign 
contributions have at least some influence on judges’ decisions.155 
By appealing to special interest groups, judges can increase their 
chances of receiving future campaign contributions from those 
groups. Money from interest groups may influence judges’ voting in 
two ways. First, the influence may be direct: judges may bend their 
rulings in a way that will help them obtain future campaign funds 
from interest groups. 
 
 150. See Hall, supra note 147, at 442 (“District-based elections . . . influence liberal justices 
to join conservative majorities in death penalty cases in Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and 
Kentucky.”). 
 151. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical 
Analysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 567–68 (2000). 
 152. Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 
AM. L. ECON. REV. 341, 345–46 (2002); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: 
The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (1999). 
 153. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The 
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary 19–22 (Univ. of Chi. 
Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008989. 
 154. See supra notes 100–07 and accompanying text. 
 155. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., supra note 12, at 4; GREENBERG 
QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE—STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASJudgesSurvey 
Results.pdf. 
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Second, the influence may be indirect. Interest groups may give 
campaign contributions to judges who happen to rule in the way that 
the interest groups prefer, increasing the judges’ chances of 
reelection. Although under this theory the contributions do not cause 
any individual judge to rule differently; rather the contributions 
indirectly influence case outcomes by increasing the probability that 
judges who share the interest groups’ preferences are elected. 
Although no study has yet explored these influences in judicial 
elections, several studies have addressed congressional contests. 
Analyses of the determinants of congressional voting have identified 
both direct and indirect influences from interest groups’ campaign 
contributions. Empirical studies of the U.S. Congress show that 
contributions from political action committees directly influence 
congressional voting.156 The studies suggest that the possibility of 
raising future campaign funds provides an incentive for legislators to 
vote in the way that interest groups prefer.157 
In addition, other studies have shown that interest groups have 
an additional indirect influence on congressional voting. They use 
their wealth to increase the probability that the people elected will 
share their political ideologies.158 Thus, the interest groups influence 
congressional voting not by giving money to legislators to change 
 
 156. See, e.g., John P. Frendreis & Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and 
Legislative Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 401, 407–09 
(1986); Woodrow Jones, Jr. & K. Robert Keiser, Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money, 
68 SOC. SCI. Q. 170, 175 (1987); Laura I. Langbein & Mark Lotwis, The Political Efficacy of 
Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U.S. House, 1986, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 413, 433–34 
(1990); John McArthur & Stephen V. Marks, Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The 
Role of Political Opportunity Cost, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 461, 467 (1988); Thomas Stratmann, 
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?, 
77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 127, 132–35 (1995); Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy 
Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345, 368 
(2002); Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects 
of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 615–17 (1991). 
 157. For a criticism of the studies that show that interest-group money buys votes, see John 
M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 605 (2005). 
 158. Professor Lowenstein has referred to these different strategies as “legislative 
strategies” (vote-buying) and “electoral strategies” (affecting who is elected). Daniel Hays 
Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 308 (1989); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Essay, Campaign Finance Reform: 
Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1272 (1994) 
(distinguishing between electoral and legislative strategies); Note, The Ass atop the Castle: 
Competing Strategies for Using Campaign Donations to Influence Lawmaking, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2610, 2610–11 (2003) (discussing legislative and electoral strategies in the context of 
campaign finance laws). 
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their votes but by increasing the probability of election for legislators 
whose past voting records show that that they share the interest 
group’s preferences. The contributions cull the interest group’s 
enemies, leaving only friendly legislators. 
Thus, regardless of whether judges vote to obtain funds or 
interest groups award funds to judges based on their past votes, it is 
possible that interest groups may affect case outcomes. 
Approximately 90 percent159 of voters and 80 percent of judges are 
concerned that with campaign contributions, interest groups are 
trying to use the courts to shape policy.160 
Three groups are the most active contributors to judicial 
campaigns. In 2004 state supreme court elections, over 60 percent of 
contributions came from interest groups that were business groups, 
labor groups, or lawyers’ organizations.161 The single largest interest 
group contributors were pro-business groups, which contributed 34 
percent of the total campaign funds raised by candidates.162 
Although mine is the first analysis to examine the relationship 
between interest group contributions and judges’ voting, some recent 
studies have examined the relationship between contributions from 
individual law firms and case outcomes when those law firms appear 
in court. Scholars have found a correlation between the sources of a 
judge’s funding and the judge’s rulings in arbitration decisions from 
the Alabama Supreme Court,163 in tort cases before state supreme 
courts in Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio,164 in cases between two 
businesses in the Texas Supreme Court,165 and in cases during the 
Supreme Court of Georgia’s 2003 term.166 Although it might seem 
 
 159. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., supra note 12, at 9. 
 160. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., supra note 155, at 9. 
 161. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 20 
(Jesse Rutledge ed., 2005), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport 
2004.pdf. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration 
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661 (1999). 
 164. Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 
SOUTHEASTERN POL. REV. 241, 255 (2000). 
 165. Madhavi McCall, The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign 
Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994–1997, 31 POL. & 
POL’Y 314, 326, 330 (2003). 
 166. Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision 
Making, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 287–89 (2007). 
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shocking that a judge would be permitted to rule in a case in which 
one of the litigants is a campaign contributor, many states allow this.167 
IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF RETENTION POLITICS 
ON JUDGES’ VOTING 
I now examine empirically the relationship between money, 
politics, and impartial justice. If judges routinely adjust their rulings 
to attract votes and campaign dollars, my results suggest that the 
delicate balance between judicial independence and accountability 
has been upset. In this Part, I explore whether judges’ voting is 
strongly associated with the preferences of the retention agents. In 
Part V, I test the relationship between judges’ voting and campaign 
contributions. 
To test the influence of fundamental ideology and retention 
politics on judges’ voting in state supreme courts, I use data from the 
State Supreme Court Data Project.168 The data include more than 
21,000 decisions involving more than four hundred individual state 
supreme court justices.169 These data include almost all state supreme 
court cases in all fifty states from 1995 to 1998.170 The data include 
variables that reflect case histories, case participants, legal issues, case 
outcomes, and individual justices’ behavior.171 I supplemented these 
data in several ways: with institutional variables that describe aspects 
of the judicial system of each state, with variables that describe the 
political affiliations of various groups and people in each state, and 
with detailed information about each judge’s career. 
I estimate a multivariate regression equation that measures how 
individual judges’ rulings are related both to the political preferences 
 
 167. Aman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial 
Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 520 (2005). 
 168. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Court Data Project, http://www.ruf. 
rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 169. Id. 
 170. State dockets exceeding two hundred cases in a single year are selected from a random 
sample of two hundred cases. Typically, case quantities are unaffected due to the limited size of 
many state supreme court dockets. Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, State Judicial Database 
Coding Rules (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/CodingRules.html. 
 171. Id. 
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of the people responsible for their retention and to other 
characteristics of the state, the judge, and the case.172 
A. The Model’s Technical Structure 
I first introduce the model in symbols, and I provide a brief 
outline of the variables. In Section B, I explain the model more fully. 
The model is: 
(1) Pr ( | ) ( Re )ob FavLitVote x tentAgent Judge Case Statei = = + + + +1 0 1 2 3 4Φ β β β β β  
FavLitVote The probability that the relevant litigant wins in case i 
RetentAgent Includes four indicator variables for whether a vote is 
given by a judge facing Republican retention agents in: 
    a partisan reelection, 
    a nonpartisan reelection, 
    an unopposed retention election, or 
    a gubernatorial reappointment. 
Judge  Includes three judge-level variables: 
    the PAJID measure of judicial ideology, 
   the number of years the judge has been on the 
court, 
   the number of years until the next retention. 
Case   Includes several case-level variables: 
    in business cases, an indicator variable for the 
general industry of the business litigant 
when relevant, 
    in civil cases, an indicator variable for the 
general issue in the case, 
 
 172. A similar analysis with more detailed econometric explanations can be found in Joanna 
Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997491. In this article, I developed 
three hypotheses about the relationship between ideology or political influences, on 
the one hand, and judges’ voting, on the other hand: judges’ voting could reflect the 
judges’ fundamental ideological beliefs, judges’ voting could reflect the preferences of 
the groups responsible for judges’ retention, or selection effects could completely 
eliminate political or ideological voting; if potential litigants bargain in the shadow of 
politics, then only cases without a clear political or ideological slant would go to trial. 
Id. (manuscript at 2). I then tested the hypotheses empirically. Id. Although I found that the 
voting of state supreme court judges is strongly associated with the stereotypical preferences of 
the retention agents, id. (manuscript at 16), this previous article did not discuss or examine any 
relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ voting. 
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    and, in criminal appeals, indicator variables for 
whether the criminal was represented by a 
public defender and whether the case was a 
murder trial. 
State   Includes several state-level variables: 
    the percentage of years since 1960 that each 
state’s legislature was majority Republican, 
    an indicator variable for whether the state has a 
lower appellate court, 
    and an indicator variable for whether the judges 
sit en banc. 
B. Details of the Model 
Equation (1) measures the relationship between judges’ voting 
and the political preferences of retention agents, while controlling for 
many other factors that might also affect voting. 
1. Dependent Variable.  The dependent variable is the probability 
that the relevant litigant wins in any given case. I examine six 
categories of cases that seem especially likely to reveal divisions 
between Republican and Democratic judges: cases between a 
business and a person, cases involving labor disputes, medical 
malpractice cases, products liability cases, tort cases,173 and criminal 
appeals. 
Certainly the facts of some of the cases under each category 
should produce no distinction between Republican and Democratic 
preferences. However, the categories do allow me to measure 
whether judges’ voting conforms to general stereotypes about 
Republican and Democratic preferences. 
The State Supreme Court Data Project coded judges in civil 
cases as voting for a litigant if they voted to make the litigant any 
better off, regardless of whether they voted to reverse a lower court 
 
 173. A decision favoring a tort plaintiff is commonly viewed as a liberal outcome whereas 
one favoring the defendant is considered a conservative outcome. See, e.g., Reginald S. Sheehan, 
William Mishler & Donald Songer, Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct 
Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 464 (1992); Jeff Yates, Holley 
Tankersley & Paul Brace, Do Institutions Really Matter? Assessing the Impact of State Judicial 
Structures on Citizen Litigiousness 7–8 (Searle Ctr. on Law, Regulation, & Econ. Growth, 
Working Paper No. 11, 2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/ 
Brace-Yates_Northwestern_conf.pdf. 
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or to change the damage award. The Project coded judges in criminal 
cases as voting for the criminal if they voted to overturn all or some 
convictions. 
2. Retention-Politics Variable.  RetentAgent includes the four 
primary variables of interest: a variable that indicates if a vote is given 
by a judge facing Republican retention agents in a partisan reelection, 
a variable that indicates if a judge is facing Republican retention 
agents in a nonpartisan reelection, a variable that indicates if a judge 
is facing Republican retention agents in an unopposed retention 
election, and a variable that indicates if a judge must be reappointed 
by a Republican governor. 
For some retention methods, the political affiliation of the 
retention agents is clear. If judges are subject to reappointment by the 
governor, then the political affiliation of the reappointing governor 
should influence the voting of judges facing reappointment. Similarly, 
the majority party in the legislature should influence the voting of 
judges facing legislative reappointment or legislative reelection. 
For other methods, however, the political affiliation of the 
retention agents is more ambiguous or difficult to determine. For 
judges facing reelection, the ideological preferences of the citizens 
voting in the reelections should influence how judges vote before the 
elections. Because there is no exact measure of the future voters’ 
preferences, however, I use the political affiliation of the states’ 
governors as a proxy for the voters’ ideological preferences. 
The governors’ party affiliation is the best measure available to 
proxy the preferences of voters in judicial elections because the same 
pool of voters usually vote for judges as for governors. In the majority 
of states, judges are elected in statewide elections,174 as are governors. 
In contrast, state legislators are typically elected by district.175 In 
addition, voter turnout (in both the number and the type of citizens) 
for judicial elections would be more similar to voter turnout in 
gubernatorial elections than voter turnout in presidential elections. 
Finally, although certain indexes of citizen ideology, such as the Berry 
measure,176 are good measures of overall citizen preferences, they may 
 
 174. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 25–28 tbl.4. 
 175. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Profile Summary, http://www.senate.mn/ 
departments/scr/redist/redprof/profiles.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 176. See generally William Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the 
American States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 329 (1998). 
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be weaker proxies for the preferences of voters in judicial elections. 
These indexes are composed of several different measures, including 
interest group ratings of the members of Congress, election returns 
for congressional races, the party composition of state legislatures, 
and the party affiliation of state governors.177 Thus, most of the 
included measures have little relationship with the preferences of the 
voters in judicial elections. Nevertheless, I also check the robustness 
of my findings against other proxies for the preferences of voters in 
judicial elections.178 
For each judge, the best prediction of the future retention agent’s 
party affiliation depends on when the judge will face retention. For 
judges that face retention during the current governor’s term, the best 
predictor of the party affiliation of the retention agents is the 
governor’s current party affiliation. For example, for a judge seeking 
retention in 1996 in a state where the governor’s term lasts from 
1994–1998, the party affiliation of the governor elected in 1994 is the 
best proxy for the political preferences of the people that will reelect 
the judge in 1996. 
In contrast, for a judge who faces retention after the current 
governor’s term, the judge’s prediction is based not only on the 
current governor’s party, but also on recent governors’ party 
affiliations. That is, the best predictor of the party affiliation of the 
future retention agents is the likelihood that the future retention 
agents will belong to a given party. For example, for a judge seeking 
retention in 2000 in a state where the current governor’s term ends in 
1998 and has had two Republican governors out of the last five 
governors, the judge’s expected probability of a future Republican 
governor—and in turn, future Republican retention agents—is 40 
percent. 
3. Control Variables.  My estimation of Equation (1) will 
separate the influence of each factor that is included, allowing me to 
distinguish the retention agents’ influence on voting from other 
influences. Thus, to determine whether retention politics really 
influences voting, it is important to control for as many other factors 
 
 177. E.g., id. at 329 
 178. Moreover, many scholars assert that under partisan elections, judicial selection is 
essentially vested with political party leaders and a judge’s nomination by the dominant party 
almost always leads to victory. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for 
Merit Selection, 68 ALB. L. REV. 713, 718 (2005) (basing the conclusions on numerous exit 
surveys and observations from New York City judicial elections). 
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as possible to ensure that the results are not caused by something 
other than retention politics.179 Ideally, one could quantify and include 
any factor related to voting. In practice, researchers include as many 
variables as is technically possible given data constraints. 
The control variables I include fall into three categories: judge-
level variables, case-level variables, and state-level variables. All of 
these should be related to voting. That is, three types of 
characteristics may contribute to determining a judge’s vote in a 
particular case: the judge’s own characteristics such as the judge’s 
fundamental ideology, case characteristics such as the type of 
litigants, and state characteristics such as the conservatism of the 
state’s laws. Unfortunately, one of the most important influences on a 
judge’s voting, the guilt or liability of the parties, is unquantifiable 
and, therefore, not included as a control variable. Nevertheless, the 
variables that I do include will pick up the marginal influence of these 
other factors on judges’ voting. 
The variables in Judge control for judge-specific characteristics 
that may be related to judges’ voting. First, it includes a measure of 
the fundamental ideology of each judge. For this proxy, I use each 
judge’s party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure, or PAJID 
score. This is the most common measure of judges’ ideology used in 
political science studies and is based on the assumption that judges’ 
ideologies can be best proxied by both their partisan affiliation and 
the ideology of their states at the time of their initial accession to 
office.180 Including the PAJID scores allows me to separate the 
influence of the judges’ own ideology from the influence of retention 
agents. I also include both a variable indicating the length of time in 
years that the individual judge has served on the court and a variable 
indicating the length of time in years until the judge’s next retention. 
These variables control for voting changes throughout a judge’s 
career and term.181 
The variables in Case control for case-level factors that may be 
related to judges’ voting. I include a series of dummy variables 
 
 179. That is, if a third, omitted variable has significant influence on voting, and that omitted 
variable is strongly correlated with retention politics, my analysis may erroneously attribute to 
the retention agent variable the relationship between voting and the omitted third variable. 
 180. Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State 
Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 393–94 (2000). 
 181. Interactions that include the time until retention are generally insignificant, most likely 
because the short period of my sample permits little variation in the time until retention for 
each year. 
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indicating the general industry of the business litigant (agriculture, 
construction, financial services, manufacturing, mining, service, trade, 
transportation, or utilities) in the estimations of cases between a 
business and an individual, employer litigants in labor disputes, 
business litigants in products liability cases, and litigants who were the 
original defendants in tort cases. In addition, all of the estimations for 
civil cases include a series of indicator variables signifying the general 
issue in the case (domestic relations, estates, contracts, or torts). The 
estimations based on criminal appeals include an indicator variable 
for whether the criminal was represented by a public defender and a 
variable indicating whether the case was a murder trial. 
The variables in State control for state-level characteristics that 
may be related to case outcomes. First, State includes the percentage 
of years since 1960 that each state’s legislature had a Republican 
majority. I use this variable as a proxy for the conservatism of the 
states’ laws. Because states with conservative laws may also be more 
likely to have Republican retention agents, this control allows me to 
isolate the influence of Republican retention agents from judges 
simply applying conservative laws in conservative states. 
In State I also include variables that indicate whether the states’ 
supreme courts have discretion to grant review (that is, whether they 
have a lower appellate court) and whether the judges sit en banc. 
Both of these variables may be relevant to the types of cases that 
supreme courts here and, in turn, to the judges’ voting. When 
supreme courts have discretion to grant review, the litigants do not 
alone control which appeals are heard. Thirty-nine states have lower 
appellate courts, and those states’ supreme courts have discretionary 
review.182 In these courts, the judges may choose to hear cases that 
give them opportunities to exercise their ideological preferences.183 
Whether the supreme courts sit en banc may also influence the 
types of cases the courts hear. The supreme courts of Alabama, 
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Virginia, and Washington 
often do not sit en banc; instead, various subsets of the judges hear 
 
 182. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 12–67. 
 183. Conceivably, litigants could decide to settle after review of their case has been granted; 
the granting of review may be a signal that the court plans to vote ideologically. However, in a 
study of civil appeals in forty-six large counties between 2001 and 2005, no litigants withdrew 
their cases after the courts of last resort granted review. THOMAS H. COHEN, APPEALS FROM 
GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 2001–2005, at 9 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Bulletin No. NCJ 212979, 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/agctlc05.pdf. 
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each case.184 The supreme courts of other states may periodically not 
sit en banc, if, for example, there is a conflict with a particular judge. 
If the ideologies of the judges on a specific court differ, and the 
litigants do not know which judges will hear their case because the 
court does not sit en banc, then the litigants cannot, when making 
settlement decisions, fully consider the court’s ideology. In some 
cases, litigants may not settle cases that they would have settled had 
they known in advance their judges’ identities. 
As is standard and appropriate in such analysis,185 the equation 
also includes a set of time dummy variables186 that capture national 
trends and influences that affect all judges but vary over time. The 
variables correct for the possibility that a change in voting may be 
due, not to retention politics, but to factors that affect all judges, such 
as trends in conservatism or changes in national laws.187 
4. Estimation Method.  Equation (1) is estimated with a 
maximum likelihood probit model. I present the marginal effects of 
each retention method–political party variable on the probability of a 
judge voting for the relevant litigant. The results tables report the 
increase in the probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigant 
under the particular retention method–political party combination, 
holding the case’s other characteristics constant. 
The base category in all estimations, when all four retention 
agent variables are zero, consists of votes by judges facing Democratic 
retention agents in any retention method and votes by judges with 
permanent tenure.188 Thus, because of the small number of judges 
with permanent tenure, every result for judges facing Republican 
retention agents is almost the mirror image of the findings for judges 
facing Democratic retention agents. That is, if I find that judges facing 
Republican retention agents are 20 percent more likely to vote for a 
particular litigant, then one can infer that judges facing Democratic 
 
 184. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 16–67. 
 185. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116–18 (5th ed. 2003) 
(explaining the use of dummy variables in regression analysis). 
 186. A dummy variable is a yes-no indicator with only two possible values, 0 and 1. 
 187. I am unable to include state-level and judge-level fixed effects because most are 
perfectly collinear with the retention variables, many of which do not change during the four-
year sample period. 
 188. For the four states with retention by legislative election or appointment, the retention 
agents are Democratic throughout my sample. 
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retention agents are approximately 20 percent less likely to vote for 
the same litigant. 
In addition, the t-statistics are computed from standard errors 
clustered by case to correct for possible clustering effects. Clustering 
effects refers to the fact that observations may be independent across 
groups (clusters), but not necessarily within groups.189 Thus, the 
standard errors from observations from within the same case may be 
relatively small when compared to standard errors from observations 
from other cases. Not controlling for possible clustering effects could 
artificially inflate my t-statistics, producing results that incorrectly 
appear to be statistically significant. 
C. Primary Empirical Results 
The results support the hypothesis that, under some retention 
methods, judges’ voting is influenced by the political preferences of 
retention agents. The table in the Appendix reports the full results for 
all variables. The table indicates the relationship between judges’ 
voting, on one hand, and the retention agent variables and control 
variables, on the other. In the table, the top number in each cell is the 
regression coefficient, which indicates for each variable the 
magnitude and direction of the relationship with judges’ votes. A 
negative coefficient indicates that a variable reduces the probability 
that a judge will vote for the Republican-favored litigant. In contrast, 
a positive coefficient indicates that a variable increases the 
probability that a judge will vote for the Republican-favored litigant. 
In addition, the table reports the t-statistic for each coefficient. In 
each cell, the t-statistic is the bottom number in parentheses. 
Coefficients with t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.645 are 
considered statistically significant at the 10 percent level, meaning 
that there is 90 percent certainty that the coefficient is different from 
zero. T-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96 indicate statistical 
significance at the more-certain 5 percent level, and t-statistics equal 
to or greater than 2.576 indicate statistical significance at the most-
certain 1 percent level. Empiricists typically require t-statistics of at 
least 1.645 to conclude that one variable affects another in the 
direction indicated by the coefficient.190 In the table, “*” and “+” 
 
 189. HALBERT WHITE, ASYMPTOTIC THEORY FOR ECONOMETRICIANS 135–36 (1984). 
 190. For each regression, the table also reports R-squared statistics. In contrast to the  
t-statistics, which measure the reliability of each individual coefficient, the R-squared measures 
the regression’s overall goodness of fit. GREENE, supra note 185, at 33–36. That is, the  
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indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Table 3 reproduces from the Appendix the coefficients and 
t-statistics for the retention agent variables. The results indicate that 
when judges face Republican retention agents in partisan reelections, 
they are more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for 
employers in labor disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical 
malpractice cases, for businesses in products liability cases, for 
original defendants in tort cases, and against criminals in criminal 
appeals.191 The magnitudes of the marginal effects are substantial but 
reasonable. For example, the results suggest that a judge facing a 
partisan reelection during the current term of a Republican governor, 
compared to the base categories, is approximately 36 percentage 
points more likely to vote in favor of businesses over individuals.192 
Table 3.  Political Influences on Judicial Voting under Different 
Retention Methods193 
Litigant 
Republican/ 
Partisan  
Republican/ 
Nonpartisan  
Republican/ 
Retention 
Election 
Republican/ 
Reappoint 
Business Vote in  0.364* 0.05+ .035 0.041 
Business v. Person (7.89) (1.65) (1.39) (0.58) 
Employer Vote in  0.359* 0.042 0.030 -0.204 
Labor Dispute (2.91) (0.69) (0.57) (1.32) 
 
R-squared measures how much of the overall variation in the dependent variable, here the 
probability of voting for the Republican-favored litigant, is explained by the explanatory 
variables. Id. at 33. Thus, the R-squared of a regression will vary between 0 and 1. Id. An  
R-squared of 0 means that the explanatory variables explain none of the dependant variable’s 
variation. Id. An R-squared of 1 means that the explanatory variables explain all of the 
variation. Id. The closer the R-squared is to 1, the better the regression explains the data. Id. 
 191. My unreported estimations confirm that the near mirror image applies for judges facing 
Democratic retention agents. 
 192. For brevity, I do not report the coefficients for all of the control variables, most of 
which are statistically insignificant. The coefficients on both the years to retention and the 
percentage of years since 1960 that each state’s legislature was majority Republican are positive 
and significant for most of the cases. 
 193. The table reports the marginal effects of each retention method/political party variable 
on the probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The 
other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” 
and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Doctor/Hospital  0.308* -0.021 0.10 -0.251 
Vote in Medmal Case (2.57) (0.22) (1.16) (0.95) 
Business Vote in  0.444* 0.077 0.004 0.607+ 
Products Liability Case (3.09) (0.78) (0.04) (1.76) 
Original Defendant  0.418* 0.048 0.067* 0.096 
Vote in Tort Case (8.90) (1.59) (2.70) (0.94) 
Vote to Overturn  -0.076+ 0.002 0.026 -0.03 
Criminal Conviction  (1.90) (0.10) (1.41) (0.39) 
The results are much weaker for the other retention methods. 
Judges facing Republican retention agents in nonpartisan reelections 
are more likely to favor the Republican-favored litigant only in cases 
between businesses and individuals. Judges facing Republican 
retention agents in unopposed retention elections are more likely to 
favor the Republican-favored litigant only in tort cases. Finally, 
judges facing reappointment by a Republican governor are more 
likely to vote for businesses only in products liability cases. 
The stronger results in both significance and magnitude for 
judges facing partisan elections are consistent with recent trends in 
these elections; partisan elections are much more likely to be 
contested and incumbents are significantly more likely to lose in the 
reelections. It appears that, to keep their jobs, judges in partisan 
election systems must appeal more to their retention agents than 
judges under other systems. 
D. Influences on Judges Not Facing Retention 
Next, I test whether the same political ideologies that are shown 
to influence judicial voting when judges face retention also influence 
the behavior of judges that do not face retention. If they do, then this 
would suggest that judges generally respond to public sentiment; that 
is, the results would suggest that all judges, whether subject to 
retention or not, attempt to conform their own judicial approach to 
public preferences. In contrast, if there is a difference between judges 
that do and do not face retention, then this would suggest that 
retention politics are an important influence on judges facing 
retention. 
First, I test whether the party affiliations of the groups found to 
influence nontenured judges—governors and legislatures—also 
influence judges with permanent tenure. The results, which are 
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reported in Table 4, show that tenured judges respond less to the 
electorate’s will than do nontenured ones. Indeed, tenured judges in 
states with Republican legislatures and Republican governors are not 
any more likely to vote in favor of Republican-favored litigants. In 
fact, tenured judges in states with Republican legislatures are more 
likely to vote to overturn a criminal conviction on appeal, the 
opposite of their untenured counterparts. 
Table 4.  The Impact of Gubernatorial and Legislative Party 
Affiliations on Judges with Permanent Tenure194 
Next, I test whether judges vote differently in their last term 
before retirement than they do when facing retention. Thirty-seven 
states have mandatory retirement laws that compel judges to retire 
 
 194. The table reports the marginal effects of each retention method/political party variable 
on the probability of the relevant litigants’ receiving a vote, based on probit estimates. The 
estimation is limited to the sample of states where judges are given life tenure or serve until age 
70: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island. See table accompanying note 81. 
In Rhode Island, judges have life tenure, see supra note 85; in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, judges serve until age 70, see supra notes 82, 86; in New Jersey, after an initial 
gubernatorial reappointment, judges serve until age 70, N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 6 (all of the 
New Jersey judges were already reappointed) The other control variables are not reported for 
brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Litigant 
Majority 
Republican 
Legislature 
Republican 
Governor 
# of 
Observ-
ations 
Business Vote in  -0.08 0.065 2164 
Business v. Person (1.04) (0.51)  
Employer Vote  0.005 -0.28 382 
in Labor Dispute (0.03) (0.95)  
Doctor/Hospital Vote  0.163  146 
in Medmal Case (0.59)   
Business Vote in  0.03 -0.072 152 
Products Liability Case (0.10) (0.14)  
Original Defendant  -0.040 -0.140 1719 
Vote in Tort Case (0.46) (0.98)  
Vote to Overturn  0.173* -0.099 3512 
Criminal Conviction (2.51) (1.04)  
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sometime between age seventy and seventy-five. By examining the 
voting of judges in their last term before mandatory retirement, I can 
test whether the same differences in voting that exist between judges 
facing Republican and Democratic retention agents also exist when 
judges are immune from retention politics. 
Table 5 reports the results. It appears that judges in their last 
term before mandatory retirement respond less to political forces 
than other judges. The results suggest that, for most categories of 
cases, there is no significant difference in voting between retiring 
judges that would have faced Republican retention agents (if they had 
not retired) and retiring judges that would have faced Democratic 
retention agents. Only in tort cases in states with partisan reelections 
and retention elections do judges that would have faced Republican 
retention agents vote for the Republican-favored litigant. In contrast, 
judges that would have faced Republican retention agents in states 
with partisan reelections are more likely, not less likely, to vote to 
overturn a criminal conviction. 
Table 5.  Influences on Judges in the Last Term before Mandatory 
Retirement195 
Litigant 
Republican/ 
Partisan  
Republican/ 
Nonpartisan 
Republican/ 
Retention 
Election 
Republican/
Reappoint 
# of 
Observ-
ations 
Business Vote in  0.175 -0.089 .044 0.071 3018 
Business v. Person (1.57) (1.52) (0.86) (1.02)  
Employer Vote  0.153 -0.099 0.167 -0.022 610 
in Labor Dispute (0.59) (0.78) (1.62) (0.12)  
Doctor/Hosp Vote  0.324 -0.078 0.159 -0.613 268 
in Medmal Case (0.94) (0.31) (0.83) (1.25)  
Business vote in  0.321 -0.098 0.160 1.14 189 
Prod. Liab. Case (0.84) (0.44) (0.78) (1.32)  
 
 195. The table reports the marginal effects of each retention method/political party variable 
on the probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The 
estimation is limited to the sample of judges in their last term of office before mandatory 
retirement. The other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Orig. Defendant  0.284* 0.010 0.111* 0.066 2615 
Vote in Tort Case (2.69) (0.16) (2.13) (0.75)  
Vote to Overturn  0.23* -0.052 0.008 -0.047 5027 
Crim. Conviction (5.34) (1.17) (0.23) (1.19)  
  
The results from Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the political 
preferences of retention agents have little influence on judges that do 
not face pressure from retention politics because they either have life 
tenure or are in their last term in office. These results suggest that, in 
contrast to judges not facing retention, public sentiment is an 
important influence on judges facing retention. 
E. Effect of Changes in Retention Agents’ Preferences 
As a further test of the importance of political pressure on 
judges, I examine if judges’ voting changes when a new governor from 
a different political party is elected. If the political affiliation of the 
current governor is an indicator of the preferences of retention 
agents, judges may take the election of a new governor from a 
different political party as a signal that the political preferences of 
retention agents have changed. During my sample, the governors 
changed parties in three states where judges face retention: 
Arkansas,196 Louisiana,197 and West Virginia.198 Judges in these three 
states must be retained in partisan elections.199 I examine the votes of 
only judges that were present both before and after the change of 
governors to ensure that the results are not just capturing the voting 
of new judges that were selected for the supreme court after the 
regime change. 
Table 6 reports the results. The results show that when a 
Republican governor replaces a Democratic governor, judges are 
more likely to vote in favor of the business in a business-versus-
person case, in favor of the employer in a labor dispute, and in favor 
of the original defendant in a tort case. This evidence provides 
 
 196. See Frank Wolfe & Elizabeth Caldwell, Mansion Ready? Huckabee on Doorstep, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 15, 1996, at A1. 
 197. See Jack Wardlaw, Changing of the Guard, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 9, 
1996, at A1. 
 198. See Fanny Seller, House Ready to Take Lead, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 9, 1997, at 
A1. 
 199. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 19, 34, 65. 
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support for the hypothesis that judges have their fingers to the wind; 
their voting appears to change immediately following a change in 
retention agents’ preferences, as proxied by the governor’s party 
affiliation. 
Table 6:  Impact of Changes in Political Influences on  
Judicial Voting200 
Litigant 
Republican 
Retention 
Agent 
# of 
Observa
-tions 
Business Vote in  0.10+ 918 
Business v. Person (1.77)  
Employer Vote in  0.284* 186 
Labor Dispute (2.13)  
Doctor/Hospital Vote  -0.26 105 
in Medmal Case (1.31)  
Business Vote in  -0.407 48 
Prod. Liability Case (1.58)  
Original Defendant  0.135+ 825 
Vote in Tort Case (1.88)  
Vote to Overturn  -0.010 1484 
Criminal Conviction (0.24)  
V.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS ON JUDGES’ VOTING 
In this Part, I examine the relationship between campaign money 
and impartial justice. That is, I explore whether judges adjust their 
rulings to attract campaign contributions from interest groups. 
 
 200. The table reports the marginal effects of a variable indicating a Republican party 
affiliation in states where the party affiliation of the people responsible for retention changes. 
Thus, the marginal effects show the change in the likelihood of a judge voting for the relevant 
litigants when the party affiliation of the retention agent changes from Democrat to Republican. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
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A. Empirical Model 
I estimate a model similar to the model in Part IV: 
(2) Pr ( | ) ( Re )ob FavLitVote x tentAgent Judge Case State IGContribi = = + + + + +1 0 1 2 3 4 5Φ β β β β β β  
All of the variables in Judge, Case, and State are the same as in 
Equation (1). Because large fundraising occurs only under systems 
using partisan and nonpartisan elections, I limit my sample to judges 
elected under these systems. Thus, the variable RetentAgent now 
includes only two variables: a variable that indicates if a vote is given 
by a judge facing Republican retention agents in a partisan reelection, 
and a variable that indicates if a judge is facing Republican retention 
agents in a nonpartisan reelection. By including these variables, I can 
separate the influence of campaign contributions on voting from the 
influence of retention politics more generally. That is, although I 
demonstrated in Part IV that judges facing Republican retention 
agents in partisan elections are more likely to vote for the 
Republican-favored litigant, I can now explore whether campaign 
contributions have an additional, yet separate, effect on judges’ 
voting. 
The new variable IGContrib includes the total dollar amount of 
campaign contributions from various interest groups in the judges’ 
most recent elections.201 I explore the relationship between judges’ 
voting and campaign contributions from five categories of interest 
groups that might have a stake in the particular type of case before 
the supreme court. First, I explore the relationship between the 
campaign contributions from pro-business groups and judges’ voting 
for the business appellant in business-versus-person cases, for the 
business in products liability cases, and for the original defendant in 
tort cases (original defendants are often businesses). If judges’ rulings 
favor pro-business interest groups that contributed to their previous 
campaigns, then one would expect to see a positive relationship 
 
 201. The data on campaign contributions comes from Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, 
Follow the Money, http://www.followthemoney.org/index.phtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). The 
nonpartisan, nonprofit charitable organization is dedicated to accurate, comprehensive, and 
unbiased documentation and research on campaign finance at the state level. Nat’l Inst. on 
Money in State Politics, Mission & History, http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/ 
index.phtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). “The Institute receives its data in either electronic or 
paper files from the state disclosure agencies with which candidates must file their campaign 
finance reports. The Institute collects the information for all state-level candidates in the 
primary and general elections and then puts it into a database.” Nat’l Inst. on Money in State 
Politics, About Our Data, http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/about_data.phtml (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
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between previous pro-business campaign contributions and the 
likelihood that judges vote for the business litigant. 
Second, I explore the relationship between the campaign 
contributions from pro-labor groups and judges’ voting for the 
employer in labor disputes. If campaign contributions make judges 
more sympathetic to pro-labor groups, then one would expect a 
negative relationship between pro-labor contributions and the 
likelihood that judges would vote for employers in labor disputes. 
Third, I estimate the relationship between the campaign 
contributions from doctor and hospital groups and judges’ voting for 
the doctor or hospital in medical malpractice cases or general tort 
cases. One would expect a positive relationship between these 
contributions and the likelihood of judges’ voting for doctors or 
hospitals if campaign contributions have an effect. 
Fourth, I estimate the relationship between campaign 
contributions from insurance companies and judges’ voting for 
litigants that were originally defendants; I assume that a relatively 
high proportion of litigants that were originally defendants are 
insured. I test the relationship between insurance contributions and 
judges’ voting for the business in business-versus-person cases, for the 
doctor or hospital in medical malpractice cases, for the business in 
products liability cases, and for the original defendant in tort cases. If 
campaign contributions from insurance companies influence judges’ 
voting, one would expect them to vote more favorably for the insured 
litigants. 
Finally, I estimate the relationship between judges’ voting and 
campaign contributions from lawyer groups. The majority of the 
lawyer groups are pro-plaintiff groups.202 Thus, one might expect these 
contributions to have the opposite influence from the insurance 
contributions. That is, one expects that lawyer contributions will 
negatively influence the likelihood that judges will vote for the 
business in business-versus-person cases, for the doctor or hospital in 
medical malpractice cases, for the business in products liability cases, 
and for the original defendant in tort cases. 
Again, I include a set of time dummy variables that capture 
national trends that might influence judges’ voting, such as trends in 
conservatism or changes in national legislation. 
 
 202. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 161, at 23 (discussing battles between pro-
business groups and lawyer groups, and the resulting campaign contributions). 
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Like the previous retention estimations, I estimate Equation (2) 
with a maximum likelihood probit model. I present the marginal 
effects of each interest group’s campaign contributions on the 
probability that a judge will vote for the relevant litigant. The results 
report the increase in the probability that a judge will vote for the 
relevant litigant for a $1,000 increase in each interest groups’ 
campaign contribution, holding the case’s other characteristics 
constant. 
As before, the t-statistics are computed from standard errors 
clustered by case to correct for any possible clustering effect. 
B. Primary Empirical Results 
The results show that there is a strong relationship between 
campaign contributions and judges’ voting. Table 7 shows that for 
judges elected in partisan elections, contributions from various 
interest groups have a statistically significant relationship with the 
probability that judges vote for litigants that the interest groups favor. 
The results show that contributions from pro-business groups 
increase the probability that judges will vote for the business litigant 
in a business-versus-person case, for the business litigant in a products 
liability case, and for the original defendant (which is often a 
business) in tort cases. 
Contributions from pro-labor groups reduce the probability that 
judges vote for the employers in labor disputes. Contributions from 
doctor and hospital groups increase the probability that judges vote 
for original defendants (which are often doctors and hospitals) in tort 
cases. 
Contributions from insurance companies increase the probability 
that judges will vote for parties that typically carry insurance: 
businesses in business-versus-person cases, businesses in products 
liability cases, and original defendants in tort cases. 
In contrast, contributions from lawyers, most of which are 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, reduce the probability that judges will vote for 
litigants that are typically defendants: businesses in business-versus-
person cases, businesses in products liability cases, and original 
defendants in tort cases. 
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Table 7.  Influence of Campaign Contributions in  
Partisan-Election Systems203 
 Contributions from Interest Groups 
Litigant 
Pro-
Business 
Groups 
Pro-
Labor 
Groups 
Doctors 
& Hosp-
itals 
Insurance 
Companies 
 
Lawyer 
Groups 
Business Vote in  0.024*   0.40* -0.02* 
Business v. Person  (2.59)   (6.83) (4.10) 
Employer Vote in   -1.23*    
Labor Dispute   (2.37)    
Doctor/Hosp. Vote    0.17 0.34 -0.02 
in Medmal Case    (1.55) (1.41) (1.63) 
Business Vote in  0.18*   0.69* -0.05* 
Prod. Liability Case (3.25)   (3.14) (3.23) 
Original Defendant  0.021+  0.14* 0.35* -0.02* 
Vote in Tort Case (1.89)  (5.37) (5.59) (3.79) 
The magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage 
increase in the probability of a judge voting for a relevant litigant for 
each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group. The 
magnitudes are significant, but reasonable. For example, the results 
suggest that for every $1,000 contribution from insurance companies, 
judges are, on average, 0.4 percent more likely to vote for business 
litigants in business-versus-person cases, 0.69 percent more likely to 
vote for businesses in products liability cases, and 0.35 percent more 
likely to vote for the original defendants in tort cases. 
The results show that the impact of large contributions can be 
important. For example, a $100,000 contribution would increase the 
average probability that a judge would vote for a business in a 
products liability case by 69 percent. These results comport with 
 
 203. The table reports the marginal effects of each groups’ campaign contributions on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage increase in the probability of a 
judge voting for a relevant litigant for each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group. 
The other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
“*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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earlier findings that judges’ votes favor specific litigants who earlier 
made contributions to the judges.204 
Table 8 reports the results for judges elected in nonpartisan 
systems. Some of the results are statistically insignificant, indicating 
that campaign contributions have a weaker relationship with judges’ 
voting in nonpartisan systems. Yet there are still several significant 
relationships. 
Contributions from pro-business groups increase the probability 
that a judge will vote for the original defendant in tort cases. 
Contributions from pro-labor groups decrease the probability that 
judges will vote for employers in labor disputes. Contributions from 
doctor and hospital groups increase the probability that judges vote 
for doctors or hospitals in medical malpractice cases and for original 
defendants (which are often doctors and hospitals) in tort cases. 
Contributions from insurance companies increase the probability that 
judges will vote for businesses in business-versus-person cases and 
original defendants in tort cases. In contrast, contributions from 
lawyers reduce the probability that judges will vote for businesses in 
business-versus-person cases and original defendants in tort cases. 
Table 8.  Influence of Campaign Contributions in  
Nonpartisan-Election Systems205 
 Contributions from Interest Groups 
Litigant 
Pro-
Business 
Groups 
Pro-
Labor 
Groups 
Doctors 
& Hosp-
itals 
Insurance 
Companies 
 
Lawyer 
Groups 
Business Vote in  0.17   1.13* -0.16* 
Business v. Person (1.23)   (3.85) (5.83) 
Employer Vote in   -0.33*    
Labor Dispute  (4.45)    
 
 204. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 205. The table reports the marginal effects of each groups’ campaign contributions on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage increase in the probability of a 
judge voting for a relevant litigant for each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group. 
The other control variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
“*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Doctor/Hospitals Vote    1.42+ 1.02 -0.06 
in Medmal Case    (1.76) (0.94) (0.58) 
Business Vote in  0.63   1.29 -0.14 
Prod. Liability Case (1.14)   (1.06) (1.48) 
Original Defendant  0.26*  0.71* 0.868* -0.16* 
Vote in Tort Case (2.04)  (4.90) (2.81) (5.12) 
Thus, Tables 7 and 8 show that there is a strong relationship 
between interest group campaign contribution and judges’ voting. 
The relationships are generally stronger for judges elected in partisan 
elections. Campaign contributions from many interest groups 
influence judges’ voting under both systems, however. 
C. Results for Judges Not Facing Reelection 
Although the results from Tables 7 and 8 reveal a strong 
relationship between interest group campaign contributions and 
judges’ voting, they do not reveal which way the causality runs. That 
is, they do not show whether campaign contributions persuade judges 
to vote in certain ways or whether interest groups contribute to the 
campaigns of those judges whose votes are consistent with the interest 
groups’ preferences. Under both of these possibilities, interest 
contributions influence state supreme court rulings. The influence can 
be direct, by influencing judges to change their votes. Or the 
influence on case outcomes can be indirect, by increasing the 
probability that a judge whose votes favor an interest group will be 
elected. 
However, as an additional test of the degree to which campaign 
contributions persuade judges to vote in certain ways, I estimate the 
relationship between contributions and voting for retiring judges. I 
examine the voting of judges in their last term before mandatory 
retirement to test whether contributions have the same relationship 
with voting on judges who will not be seeking reelection, and thus will 
not solicit campaign contributions in the future. If contributions have 
a weaker relationship with the voting of retiring judges, then this 
suggests that some of the relationship between contributions and 
voting can be explained by judges’ voting in a way that will likely 
increase the future contributions from interest groups at the time of 
their next reelection campaign. That is, a weaker relationship for 
retiring than nonretiring judges would suggest that an interest group’s 
campaign contributions can convince judges to change their rulings, 
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rather than just increasing the probability of election of judges whose 
rulings happen to favor the interest group. 
I reestimate Equation (2), but this time I include an interaction 
variable that shows the interaction between interest group 
contributions and an indicator for whether a judge is retiring. By 
including this variable, I am able to measure separately the 
relationship between contributions and voting for nonretiring judges 
and retiring judges. The results for judges elected in partisan elections 
are reported in Table 9; the top panel reports the results for judges 
that are not retiring, and the bottom panel shows the results for 
judges that are retiring. The results show that fewer of the 
contribution variables have a statistically significant relationship with 
the voting of retiring judges. Although this could be caused by a 
smaller number of observations for retiring judges, it does show that 
most interest group contributions have no systematic relationship 
with the voting of retiring judges. 
Table 9.  Differences in the Influence of Campaign Contributions on 
Nonretiring Judges versus Retiring Judges206 
Litigant 
Pro-
Business 
Groups 
Pro-
Labor 
Groups 
Doctors 
& Hosp-
itals 
Insurance 
Companies 
 
Lawyer 
Groups 
 Nonretiring Judges 
Business Vote in  0.027*   0.49* -0.04* 
Business v. Person (2.97)   (7.05) (5.48) 
Employer Vote in   -1.0+    
Labor Dispute  (1.67)    
Doctor/Hospitals Vote    0.18 0.59+ -0.01 
in Medmal Case   (1.41) (1.82) (0.61) 
 
 206. The table reports the marginal effects of each groups’ campaign contributions on the 
probability of a judge voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients show the average percentage increase in the probability of a 
judge voting for a relevant litigant for each $1,000 contribution from a special interest group. 
The estimations reported in the top panel are limited to the sample of judges not in their last 
term before mandatory retirement; the estimations reported in the bottom panel are limited to 
the sample of judges in their last term of office before mandatory retirement. The other control 
variables are not reported for brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” 
represent significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Business Vote in  0.24+   1.27* -0.08* 
Product Liability Case (1.88)   (3.63) (2.51) 
Original Defendant  0.023*  0.14* 0.51* -0.03* 
Vote in Tort Case (2.20)  (5.32) (6.41) (3.83) 
 Retiring Judges 
Business Vote in  0.35   -4.8* -0.6* 
Business v. Person (1.94)+   (2.55) (4.37) 
Employer Vote in   -4.6    
Labor Dispute  (0.77)    
Doctor/Hospitals Vote    -0.08 -7.5 -0.5 
in Medmal Case   (0.01) (0.98) (0.95) 
Business Vote in  -0.50   -22.2* -1.1+ 
Product Liability Case (0.62)   (2.74) (1.90) 
Original Defendant  0.24  -0.13 -6.7* -0.5* 
Vote in Tort Case (1.21)  (0.39) (3.31) (3.12) 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients on 
contributions from insurance companies and lawyer groups indicate 
that retiring judges that received contributions from these groups in 
the most recent election are even less likely to vote for certain 
Republican-favored litigants than they would have been if they were 
not retiring. For brevity, I do not report the results for judges elected 
in nonpartisan elections, but they show almost no systematic 
relationship between any interest group’s contributions and judges’ 
voting. 
These results suggest that the strong relationship shown in Part V 
between campaign contributions and how nonretiring judges vote is 
due, at least in part, to campaign contributions causing the judges to 
change their votes. That is, if the relationship was due merely to the 
campaign contributions permitting the election of a higher proportion 
of judges who naturally already vote the way that the interest groups 
prefer, then campaign contributions should have the same 
relationship with the voting of all judges, whether retiring or not. 
VI.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Supporters of the independence model, adopted in federal 
courts, view almost complete independence as optimal. In contrast, 
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supporters of the accountability model have suggested that modest 
pressure from judicial elections is beneficial. Increasingly contentious 
elections and high campaign spending in some states may have placed 
judges under such strong political pressure that the important balance 
between judicial accountability and independence may be at risk. The 
following changes might help to maintain balance in the 
accountability model. 
A. Permanent Tenure and Maintaining Accountability 
The most extreme reform that would increase judicial 
independence in state supreme courts would be to grant permanent 
tenure to state judges. Like federal judges, state judges would not 
have to seek retention and they could serve for life or until some 
mandatory retirement age. 
Systems with permanent tenure would not completely sacrifice 
accountability for independence. Indeed, an extensive literature on 
federal judges argues that these judges are accountable to the degree 
that they are concerned with improving their reputation, being cited 
by their peers, being promoted, minimizing future reversals, and 
reducing the possibility of political retribution.207 Similarly, foreign 
court systems that give permanent tenure to their judges maintain 
judicial accountability through various methods. Examples are the 
powers that governments sometimes wield to control judges’ 
promotions, the ability to grant permanent appointments after 
probationary appointments, the power over judicial transfers, the 
power over judicial salaries and budgets, and the ability of the 
legislature or executive to fire disfavored judges. Although many 
sources of pressure exist, I limit my discussion to the major sources: 
those that threaten a substantial influence on a judge’s career. 
 
 207. For surveys of the literature on motivations of judicial behavior, see generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges, 36 RAND J. 
ECON. 275 (2005); Hugo Mialon, Paul Rubin & Joel Schrag, Judicial Hierarchies and the  
Rule-Individual Tradeoff (Emory Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-5, 2004), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=637564. 
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 a. Promotion Procedures.  The agents responsible for deciding 
whether a judge is promoted—the promotion agents—may exert 
pressure. If judges are promoted to higher courts based on their 
records, then they may decide to create records consistent with a 
promotion agent’s ideology. 
For example, the appointments and promotion process in 
Germany, and formerly in Britain, creates incentives for both judges 
and those who seek appointment to the bench to shape their records 
to the promoting agent’s political orientation. 
Until 2005, top-level judges in England were, in effect, appointed 
and promoted by the lord chancellor, a political appointee and 
cabinet member: although judges were, technically, appointed by 
either the queen (high court judges) or the prime minister (court of 
appeal judges and house of lords judges), the queen and prime 
minister in practice followed the lord chancellor’s advice.208 Because 
of the lord chancellor’s effective power, critics argued that judges 
were often selected based on political patronage instead of merit.209 
An empirical study of decisions by Court of Appeal judges from 1951 
to 1986, however, found no evidence that judges’ records were a 
factor in their promotion to the House of Lords.210 
Nevertheless, in response to these and other criticisms, the 
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005211 removed the lord chancellor’s 
unfettered appointment and promotion powers and vested many of 
them in a new Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC).212 
Following this reform, British judges are selected and promoted by 
this independent body of fifteen commissioners drawn from the 
judiciary, the legal professions, tribunals, the lay magistracy, and the 
lay public.213 The Reform Act requires the commission to select 
 
 208. See Kate Malleson, The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales: 
New Wine in New Bottles?, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 39, 40–42 
(Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 349, 353–54 (1993). 
 209. See Malleson supra note 208, at 41 (indicating that it was “increasingly difficult to 
sustain” the idea that judges were selected “on the basis of merit rather than political 
patronage”). 
 210. Salzberger, supra note 208, at 354–56. 
 211. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.). 
 212. Id. c. 4, § 61 (creating JAC); id. c. 4, §§ 63–107 (detailing the role of JAC for different 
levels of courts); see also Malleson, supra note 208, at 39–41 (indicating that the creation of the 
JAC “significantly reduced the role of the executive in the selection process”). 
 213. Malleson, supra note 208, at 48. 
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candidates solely on merit and to then make recommendations to the 
lord chancellor, who can reject the recommendations only after 
providing reasons.214 
In Germany, two of the highest courts, the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the Federal 
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), have a process for 
appointments and promotions that is substantially political.215 Judges 
on the Constitutional Court are “selected by a . . . small group of 
leading members of political parties . . . [in] the Bundestag and . . . the 
second chamber of the Bundesrat.”216 Although commentators 
suggest that judges are more likely to be promoted when their records 
“mirror . . . the political orientation of the . . . government[al body] 
choosing them,”217 there is a high degree of continuity on the court; 
political parties typically retain “their” chair in the court.218 
Similarly, the judges of the Federal Court of Justice are selected 
by the Committee for the Selection of Judges and appointed by the 
President of the Federal Republic of Germany.219 The Committee is 
composed of the ministers of justice of the sixteen federal states and 
sixteen additional members who are selected by the German Federal 
Parliament.220 Although the Committee typically seeks proportional 
representation of the political parties in the court,221 scholars agree 
that the process of selecting judges is a political process in which 
judges are selected based at least in part on their judicial decisions’ 
political orientation.222 
Similar promotion procedures may create political pressure on 
lower court judges in other countries. In Australia, the 
 
 214. Judicial Appointments Comm’n, Step-by-Step Guide to Processes, http://www. 
judicialappointments.gov.uk/select/step.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 215. Christine Landfried, The Selection Process of Constitutional Court Judges in Germany, 
in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 208, at 196, 197, 202. 
 216. Id. at 197. 
 217. See, e.g., id. 
 218. Id. at 202. 
 219. Russell A. Miller & Peer C. Zumbansen, Judicial Selection Controversy at the Federal 
Court of Justice, 2 GERMAN L.J. art. 8, ¶ 15 (2001), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article. 
php?id=69. 
 220. Id. ¶ 4. 
 221. Id. ¶ 17. 
 222. See id. ¶ 22 (“[O]ne can do nothing to prevent the parties charged with selecting judges 
from bringing their . . . political . . . values to bear on the selection . . . .”). 
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Commonwealth attorney general appoints judges to the High Court223 
and is criticized for making selections based on political patronage 
rather than merit.224 Likewise, in South Africa, where judges were 
appointed by the president at the advice of the minister of justice, the 
process received criticism for pushing through judicial appointees that 
were loyal to the current government’s views.225 Finally, because 
American federal judges are promoted by the President, an incentive 
exists for them to shape their decisions to curry favor with the current 
administration. 
b. Probationary Appointments.  Probationary appointments 
provide another source of political pressure on judges. For example, 
in Russia, federal judges are granted life tenure, but only after an 
initial probationary three-year appointment.226 After three years, the 
president chooses whether the judge will be reappointed.227 
Commentators suggest that judges who make decisions consistent 
with the president’s ideology are more likely to be reappointed.228 For 
example, Lubov Osipkina was not reappointed after she spoke out 
against government corruption.229 
Although this political pressure may not be permanent, it may 
dictate judges’ decisions for a few years. 
c. Judicial Transfers.  Another source of political pressure on 
judges results from the ability of the executive to transfer judges to 
undesirable courts. If a political appointee determines whether judges 
will maintain or improve their geographic location, judges have an 
incentive to render decisions that are consistent with the political 
appointee’s ideology. 
 
 223. Elizabeth Handsley, ‘The Judicial Whisper Goes Around’: Appointment of Judicial 
Officers in Australia, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 208, 
at 122, 123–24. 
 224. See id. at 126 (describing the controversial High Court appointment of a cabinet 
minister who lacked the legal experience typical of other High Court appointees). 
 225. François du Bois, Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 208, at 280, 283–84. 
 226. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, The Russian Federation 9 (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.icj.org/ 
IMG/pdf/Russia_chapter-final_Copy_.pdf. 
 227. See id. at 14. 
 228. See, e.g., id. at 9 (“[J]udges who were compliant with the executive were said to stand 
the best chance of receiving a life appointment . . . .”). 
 229. Id. at 14. 
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For example, judges in Japan face strong political pressure from 
the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) through the lever of 
judicial transfers.230 The LDP uses the appointment power of the 
cabinet to ensure a politically compliant Supreme Court and 
Secretariat.231 The Secretariat, in turn, decides which judges obtain the 
best postings.232 Empirical analyses suggest that when judges render 
decisions contrary to the interest of the LDP, the Secretariat punishes 
them with transfers to unattractive posts in obscure courts.233 As a 
result, most judges are deterred from ruling against the interests of 
the LDP. 
Similarly, in India, the president has employed the power of 
transfer to exert pressure on judges.234 The president has transferred 
several High Court judges that delivered judgments against the 
government’s interests to unpopular regions of the country, where the 
judges suffer lower living standards and language barriers.235 The 
transfer power may motivate at least some judges to issue rulings that 
are favorable to the government. 
The same thing can happen in Mexico. A ruling against the 
interest of the government can result in a federal judge being 
transferred to another region.236 
d. Judicial Salaries and Budgets.  Government control over 
judicial salaries and court budgets is another way that political parties 
can pressure judges. For example, the judicial branch of Venezuela 
lacks financial autonomy; it has to submit an annual budget to the 
executive branch, which may reduce or amend the budget.237 Some 
commentators argue that executive control over the courts’ budget is 
 
 230. J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 10–12, 57 (2003). 
 231. Id. at 126. 
 232. Id. at 60–61. 
 233. Id. at 48–61. 
 234. Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and 
Contemporary Challenges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 590, 
608 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985). 
 235. See id. 
 236. See Jon Mills, Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the Rule of 
Law, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 115, 126 n.31 (2004). 
 237. Josefina Calcaño de Temeltas, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 997, 998 (1996). 
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one of the primary means by which the executive branch pressures 
the courts, and thus it is a main obstacle to judicial independence.238 
Similarly, judges in Japan,239 India,240 and Nigeria241 have reason to 
fear cuts in compensation if they rule against the government. 
Thus, many systems with permanent tenure for judges, including 
both the U.S. federal court system and many foreign court systems, 
do achieve a degree of judicial accountability. Nevertheless, research 
shows that most citizens do not want to “give up their vote” when it 
comes to reelecting state court judges.242 Because people generally 
prefer to reelect their state court judges, judicial elections will need to 
be altered, rather than eliminated. 
B. Reforming Judicial Elections 
Instead of abolishing judicial retention completely, contested 
elections could be abolished and replaced with merit plans, which 
combine merit selection with retention elections. Under these plans, a 
“bipartisan judicial nominating commission . . . . reviews applications 
for judgeships [and then] compiles a list of [qualified] applicants.”243 
The commission submits this list to the governor, who appoints one of 
the candidates from the list of recommendations.244 “Once appointed, 
the judges regularly face . . . [unopposed] retention elections,” in 
which incumbent judges appear on a ballot asking voters only 
“whether . . . the judge should [be retained] in office.”245 
This reform ensures that citizens still have a voice through 
retention elections and can hold judges accountable. Moreover, 
 
 238. See, e.g., MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
LATIN AMERICA 153 (2002) (describing the negative effects on the justice system due to a 
politicized judicial budget). 
 239. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 230, at 21–22, 37–38, 59–60 (using data 
analysis to demonstrate that the Japanese government slows judges’ salary advancements 
following unfavorable rulings). 
 240. See Shetreet, supra note 234, at 608. 
 241. See Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the 
Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 9, 37–38 (2005) (“‘One 
of the whips used by civil servants to force Judges to ‘behave’ is in the allocation of residential 
quarters . . . .’ It is therefore not surprising that some judges go out of their way to demonstrate 
their fealty to the executive.” (quoting P.O.E. BASSEY, THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY: THE 
DEPARTING GLORY 20 (2000))). 
 242. Schotland, supra note 2, at 1082. 
 243. Caufield, supra note 77, at 627–28. 
 244. Id. at 628. 
 245. Id. 
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because elections would be uncontested, candidates would no longer 
have to raise as many campaign contributions. Thus, judges would no 
longer have to vote in a way that would help them obtain 
contributions. In addition, because the retention rate of incumbents 
in retention elections is much higher than that in contested election 
systems,246 judges would not have to appeal so relentlessly to 
constituents. Indeed, my empirical results show that retention politics 
have almost no influence on the voting of judges under merit plan 
systems.247 
Merit plans are imperfect, however. For example, the selection 
commissions that compile the lists of candidates for the governor are 
typically partisan in both their composition and deliberations.248 Thus, 
judges may still be selected based on their political preferences. In 
contrast to systems with contested reelections, however, once they are 
on the bench, there will be much less pressure on the judges to vote 
with the political preferences of the retention agents. Although there 
have been some instances in which judges were not retained in 
retention elections following heated political campaigns against 
them,249 incumbents are very rarely defeated in retention elections.250 
C. Reforming Campaign Finance 
As with the excessive influence from retention politics, the sure 
way to eliminate money’s influence on judges’ decisions is to 
eliminate judicial elections. Because of the accountability model’s 
popularity, however, this is probably politically infeasible. The 
following is a brief outline of several proposals that attempt to reduce 
money’s influence, without eliminating elections.251 
 
 246. Hall, supra note 96, at 177 (presenting data indicating that incumbents lose 1.8 percent 
of sampled retention elections compared with 7.4 percent in sampled nonpartisan elections and 
22.9 percent in sampled partisan elections). 
 247. See supra table accompanying note 193. 
 248. McLeod, supra note 167, at 513. 
 249. For details of these campaigns, see Reid, supra note 127, at 49–59; Robert S. 
Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California 
Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2036–42 (1988). 
 250. Hall, supra note 96, at 177. 
 251. For a more detailed discussion of these and other proposals, see McLeod, supra note 
167, at 515–21. 
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Although the government cannot constitutionally impose 
spending limits on political campaigns,252 some states have 
experimented with voluntary spending limits as a way to reduce 
judges’ dependence on contributions.253 There is little incentive, 
however, for judges to comply with the voluntary limits; voters do not 
appear to punish judges that refuse to comply.254 
Other states have experimented with publicly funding judicial 
races.255 The states provide direct cash payments to candidates in 
judicial races, and in return, the candidates who accept public funding 
agree to spend only the publicly provided funds.256 Although publicly 
financing elections reduces judges’ dependence on campaign 
contributions, it would not necessarily make judges more 
independent. Because independent special interest groups would not 
be similarly limited in their spending to oppose candidates, judges 
would still face pressure to vote in ways that do not provoke 
opposition.257 
Finally, states could consider tightening their recusal rules. 
Although state ethics codes generally require judges to recuse 
themselves in cases in which they have a conflict,258 the codes have 
generally not been interpreted to require recusal merely because a 
case involves a campaign contributor.259 
Requiring recusal when a case involves a campaign contributor, 
however, would create at least two difficulties. First, although 
stronger recusal rules may eliminate any bias in judges’ voting toward 
specific attorneys or litigants that individually contributed to their 
 
 252. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for 
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 139–42 
(1998) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 253. For example, Texas and New York have tried this approach. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.  
§ 253.164(a) (Vernon 2003) (requiring either voluntary compliance with spending limits or a 
declaration of intent to exceed limits); SARA MATHIAS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, ELECTING 
JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 45 (1990) (describing a judicial 
election in Rochester, New York). 
 254. See MATHIAS, supra note 253, at 45 (describing an election in which seven of eight 
judicial candidates pledged to limit their spending to $25,000, whereas the eighth candidate 
spent $100,000 and won the election). 
 255. For example, North Carolina fully funds all candidates for appellate courts and 
Wisconsin provides partial funding for its supreme court candidates. Michael W. Bowers, Public 
Financing of Judicial Campaigns: Practices and Prospects, 4 NEV. L.J. 107, 116 (2003). 
 256. Id. at 118. 
 257. McLeod, supra note 167, at 519. 
 258. MATHIAS, supra note 253, at 52. 
 259. McLeod, supra note 167, at 520. 
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campaign, it would not eliminate all or even most bias. It would still 
permit judges to participate in cases in which the contributor was not 
a litigant or an attorney, but in which the contributor had an interest. 
For example, stricter recusal rules would not prevent a judge who had 
received contributions from a medical-association tort-reform group 
from ruling in medical malpractice tort cases. 
Second, as a practical matter, if campaign contributions are 
permitted, then stricter recusal rules would be impossible in many 
communities. In communities with small numbers of lawyers and 
small numbers of judges, strict recusal rules might require judges to 
recuse themselves in almost every case. In these communities, the 
only way to prevent these wholesale recusals would be to prohibit 
lawyers from contributing to campaigns. But this would probably be 
unconstitutional. 
Perhaps campaign contributions are simply inconsistent with 
maintaining the judiciary’s legitimacy. Reasonable minds can differ 
about whether it is appropriate under the accountability model for a 
judge to face modest pressure from the citizens of the judge’s own 
jurisdiction. It seems much worse for campaign contributions to allow 
wealthy groups and individuals, many of whom are not even from the 
judge’s jurisdiction, to generate great pressure on judges. 
And yet it is far from clear that campaign spending in judicial 
elections has purely negative consequences. For example, when 
candidates spend money on their campaigns, they provide 
information to allow voters to make more informed decisions. With 
campaign contributions, voters must rely on a contest of biased 
information. Without contributions, voters have next to no 
information. Moreover, the more money that is spent in judicial 
elections, the higher the levels of voter participation.260 A vigorous 
campaign stimulates voter interest and fewer voters are 
disenfranchised by ignorance. 
CONCLUSION 
My empirical results suggest that recent trends may threaten the 
necessary balance between judicial independence and accountability. 
The results about the increasingly contentious retention politics 
 
 260. Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effect of Money on 
Ballot Roll-Off in State Supreme Court Elections 17, 28 tbl.5 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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suggest that in states with certain retention systems, retention politics 
strongly affect many case outcomes. The results suggest that judges 
may frequently shape their rulings on many different subject matters 
to appeal to retention agents. The subject matters range widely, from 
all cases in which an individual faces a business, to labor disputes, to 
medical malpractice cases, to other tort cases, to products liability 
cases, to criminal appeals.261 And the magnitude of politics’ influence 
on judges’ rulings is substantial, often making it much more likely that 
a judge will vote to favor the retention agent’s preferences. 
Like the impact of retention politics, the recent flow of campaign 
money into judicial elections has also affected judges’ rulings across a 
wide range of subjects. Also like the effect of retention politics, the 
impact of the new campaign money is large, often making it 
substantially more likely that a judge’s rulings will favor campaign 
contributors. 
Together, competitive judicial politics and campaign money may 
influence judges’ decisions so profoundly that the important balance 
between judicial accountability and independence is threatened. 
Reforms must eliminate the intense pressure on judges to vote in a 
way that attracts votes and campaign contributions. There is no sign 
that the politicization of state supreme courts and elections to them is 
lessening. Until reforms are enacted, the application of impartial 
justice is at risk. 
 
 261. See supra text accompanying note 191. 
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APPENDIX: FULL SET OF PRIMARY RESULTS262 
 
 
 262. The table reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a judge 
voting for the relevant litigants, based on probit estimates. The indicator variables for years, 
general issue in the case, and general industry of the business litigant are not reported for 
brevity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. “*” and “+” represent significance at the 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
